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Trade Law’s Responses to the Rise of China 
Wentong Zheng* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article offers a systematic examination of trade law’s responses to the 
emergence of China as a major player in world trade. As an intricate set of rules 
written largely prior to the advent of the China era, trade law had to readjust to 
the powerful newcomer in ways that eventually changed trade law itself. This 
Article investigates these changes in four major areas of trade law: antidumping, 
countervailing duties, safeguards, and managed trade. In almost all of those 
areas, trade law witnessed a protectionist shift against Chinese products at the 
expense of sound, consistent principles. But, at the same time, trade law has 
corrected some of the most egregious protectionist policies on China. These 
adaptations on the part of trade law tell a story of how an organic legal system 
evolves in response to changing external circumstances. This Article concludes 
that at least as an initial assessment, trade law has been rather successful in 
accommodating China in the new world trade order and has preserved the 
structural stability of the world trade system without deviating too far from its 
core principles. 
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INTRODUCTION 
One of the “great dramas” of the twenty-first century is the ascent of China 
on the world stage.1 In the span of less than four decades, China’s per capita 
gross domestic product leapt almost forty-fold from less than two hundred U.S. 
dollars in 1981 to over seventy-five hundred U.S. dollars in 2014.2 In 2010, 
China surpassed Japan to become the world’s second-largest economy after the 
United States.3 Measured in purchasing power parity, China’s economy has 
already overtaken that of the United States as the world’s largest.4 
One key reason for China’s miraculous economic growth is its participation 
in international trade. In 1978, China accounted for less than one percent of 
world trade.5 That percentage jumped to over ten percent in 2013, twelve years 
after China’s accession to the World Trade Organization.6 Today, China is one 
of the most important players in world trade, ranking as the world’s largest 
exporting country and second largest importing country of merchandise.7 
1. See G. John Ikenberry, The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal
System Survive?, FOREIGN AFF., Jan./Feb. 2008, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2008-
01-01/rise-china-and-future-west.
2.  See GDP PER CAPITA (current US$), WORLD BANK (2016), 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD. 
3. Andrew Monahan, China Overtakes Japan as World’s No. 2 Economy, WALL ST. J., Feb.
14, 2011, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703361904576142832741439402. 
4. Keith Fray, China’s Leap Forward: Overtaking the U.S. as the World’s Biggest Economy,
FIN. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2014, http://blogs.ft.com/ftdata/2014/10/08/chinas-leap-forward-overtaking-the-
us-as-worlds-biggest-economy/. Purchasing Power Parity measures a country’s economy taking into 
account varying price levels between countries, particularly in goods and services that are not open 
to international competition. Id. 
5. Markus Taube, Economic Relations Between the PRC and the States of Europe, in CHINA
AND EUROPE SINCE 1978: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 78, 80 (Richard L. Edmonds ed. 2002). 
6.  See Trade Profile: China, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?Country=CN& (last visited July 31, 
2016).  
7. See id.
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The rise of China represents a se ismic shift in the world trade order. While 
creating enormous economic opportunities within its borders, China’s 
participation in world trade caused massive job losses in countries that import 
Chinese products.8 In response, China’s trading partners took numerous trade 
actions against Chinese products, within and without the parameters of global 
trade law.9 
This Article documents how trade law responded to the rise of China in 
world trade. As an intricate set of rules written largely prior to the advent of the 
China era, trade law had to readjust to the powerful newcomer in ways that 
eventually changed trade law itself. This Article investigates these changes in 
four major areas of trade law: antidumping, countervailing duties, safeguards, 
and managed trade.10 In almost all of those areas, trade law witnessed a 
protectionist shift against Chinese products at the expense of sound, consistent 
principles. But at the same time, trade law has corrected some of the most 
egregious protectionist policies on China. These nuanced responses showcase 
trade law’s struggle to regain its footing in the face of unprecedented challenges 
posed by China’s emergence as a major economic power. 
Trade law’s responses to China offer a case study of the compromises 
inherent in “embedded liberalism,” a trade system where the objective of free 
trade is balanced against the objective of allowing national governments 
sufficient space for protectionist policies.11 This Article tells a story of how 
China disrupted this balance, and how trade law attempted to rebalance itself by 
finetuning the major trade policy instruments as they were applied to China. The 
Article concludes that at least as an initial assessment, trade law has been rather 
successful in preserving the systemic stability of the world trade system without 
compromising too much on its core principles. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I lays out the two competing 
considerations of trade law: free trade principles and protectionism. Part II 
discusses how trade law’s balance between these two competing considerations 
was altered in response to the external shocks China caused to the world trade 
system. In so doing, it centers its discussions on WTO law and policies practiced 
by the United States and the European Union in four major trade law areas: 
antidumping, countervailing duties, safeguards, and managed trade. Finally, Part 
8. According to an estimate by a Washington-based think tank, trade with China caused the
loss of 3.2 million jobs in the United States between 2001 and 2013. See Robert E. Scott & Will 
Kimball, China Trade, Outsourcing and Jobs, ECON. POL’Y INST. BRIEFING PAPER #385, Dec. 11, 
2014, at 2, http://s2.epi.org/files/2014/bp385-china-trade-deficit.pdf. 
9. See Wenhua Ji & Cui Huang, China’s Experience in Dealing With WTO Dispute
Settlement: A Chinese Perspective, 45 J. WORLD TRADE 1, 2 (2011) (“Chinese Products are 
frequently subjected to trade remedy measures and non-tariff barriers in overseas markets . . . .”). 
10. See infra Part II.
11. For discussions of embedded liberalism, see ANDREW LANG, WORLD TRADE LAW AFTER 
NEOLIBERALISM: REIMAGINING THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER (2011); John G. Ruggie, 
International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism and the Post-war 
Economic Order, 36 INT’L ORGANIZATION 379 (1982).  
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III offers thoughts on the prospect of trade law’s rebalancing with respect to 
China and whether that rebalancing has been successful thus far. 
I.  
TRADE LAW AS A BALANCE 
This Article starts with a basic proposition that trade law embodies a 
delicate balance between two competing considerations: free trade principles 
and protectionism. On one hand, trade law strives to adhere to a set of free trade 
principles aimed at reducing trade barriers and discriminatory practices. On the 
other hand, as a matter of practical necessity, trade law condones certain 
protectionist policies that deviate from its core principles for purposes of 
maintaining the structural stability of the world trade system. These two 
competing considerations of trade law have to be viewed together to gain a full 
appreciation of the nature and practice of trade law. As shall become clear, they 
also form the basic analytical framework for examining trade law’s responses to 
China’s rise in world trade. 
A. Free Trade Principles 
One overarching goal of trade law is to move from a “power-oriented” to a 
“rule-oriented” regime.12 Under the auspices of the General Agreements on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and subsequently the WTO, trade law has come a 
long way in accomplishing this goal.13 Scholars concededly disagree as to the 
extent to which trade law could be characterized as “law” as a court would apply 
it.14 However, there is a broad consensus that having a rule-based trade law 
 
 12.  See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF GATT AND THE WTO: INSIGHTS ON 
TREATY LAW AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS 8-10 (2000) (discussing the value of a rule-oriented 
approach as opposed to a power-oriented approach in the design of international institutions relating 
to economic activity). 
 13.  See Rachel Brewster, Rule-Based Dispute Resolution in International Trade Law, 92 VA. 
L. REV. 251, 253-60 (2006) (describing the shift from the power-based dispute resolution system 
under the GATT to the rule-based system under the WTO); R. E. Hudec, Free Trade, Sovereignty, 
Democracy: The Future of the World Trade Organization, 1 WORLD TRADE REV. 211, 219-20 
(2002) (“The conventional history of GATT/WTO dispute settlement . . . teaches that GATT dispute 
settlement evolved from a ‘diplomatic’ instrument into a ‘judicial’ instrument.”); Arie Reich, From 
Diplomacy to Law: The Juridicization of International Trade Relations, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 
775, 776 (1997) (“In recent years, however, there is a growing demand by States to regulate their 
trade relations by using norms and enforcement procedures that are LEGAL in character, create 
significant limitations on the sovereignty of the States, and, in extreme cases, even exclude the 
States’ power to determine policy in certain socio-economic fields.”). But see Joost Pauwelyn, Rule-
Based Trade 2.0? The Rise of Informal Rules and International Standards and How They May 
Outcompete WTO Treaties, 17 J. INT’L ECON. L. 739, 740-45 (2014) (arguing that since the turn of 
the millennium trade law has witnessed a stagnation of formal treaty-making and a rise in informal 
rules and mechanisms). 
 14.  Some scholars take the view that the GATT, in essence, is a legal system. See, e.g., JAMES 
FAWCETT, LAW AND POWER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 87 (1982) (“GATT is both in form and 
practice an illuminating example of law in international relations.”); Daniel K. Tarullo, Logic, Myth 
and International Economic Order, 26 HARV. INT’L L.J. 533, 533 (1985) (noting that the 
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/bjil/vol34/iss2/3
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15779/Z38CS1Z
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system is desirable because it allows for “creating greater predictability, 
redressing unfair power imbalances, and preventing escalating international 
tensions.”15 
Trade law, however, is not just any set of rules. It is built on certain 
principles. At the core of trade law is the so-called “liberal economic doctrine,” 
which recognizes the benefits of free trade to all participating countries.16 As a 
result, the primary purpose of the GATT and the WTO is to dismantle trade 
barriers.17 This free trade agenda manifests itself in the fundamental principles 
of the GATT and the WTO, such as the most-favored nation principle, the 
national treatment principle, and the tariff binding principle.18 
Trade law’s aspiration to be a principles-based system requires it to be 
systemically coherent, so that its various components reflect the same policy 
considerations.19 This systemic coherence is crucial for, among other things, 
consistent judicial interpretations of inevitably incomplete treaty rules.20 The 
desire to maintain systemic coherence in trade law can be seen in the WTO’s 
umbrella agreement—the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO. The 
preamble of the Marrakesh Agreement refers to “the basic principles . . . and the 
objectives underlying this multilateral trading system.”21 The WTO Appellate 
 
international trade system “looks more like a legal system than do the areas of international law 
traditionally denominated ‘public’False”). Some other scholars recognize that the law has some role 
in the conduct of international trade relations, but emphasize the limitations of that role. See, e.g., 
C.F. Teese, A View from the Dress Circle in the Theatre of Trade Disputes, 5 WORLD ECON. 43, 51 
(1982) (“[T]he GATT has been reduced from a legalistic instrument, designed to secure an open 
trading system, to a document which in respect of some important rules acts only to exhort 
governments not to intervene in international trade.”); Phillip R. Trimble, International Trade and 
the “Rule of Law”, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1017 (1985) (noting that one group of scholars believe 
that “the principal value of the GATT is that it provides a process through which trade problems are 
negotiated and compromised within a general framework of rules.”). For detailed discussions of the 
two views, see Miquel Montana I Mora, A GATT With Teeth: Law Wins Politics in the Resolution of 
International Trade Disputes, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 103, 109-11 (1993). 
 15.  JOHN JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC RELATIONS 340 (2d ed. 1997). Even Joost Pauwelyn, who emphasizes the role of 
informal rules and standards in world trade, does not dispute the desirability of a rule-based trade 
law system. His argument is only that informal rules and standards may better achieve the goals of a 
rule-based trade law system in terms of predictability, stability, and neutrality. See Pauwelyn, supra 
note 13, at 739-40.  
 16.  Reich, supra note 13, at 781. 
 17.  Id. at 780. See also JAN HOOGMARTENS, EC TRADE LAW FOLLOWING CHINA’S 
ACCESSION TO THE WTO 10 (2004). 
 18.  For discussions of the fundamental principles of the GATT and the WTO, see Principles 
of the Trading System, WORLD TRADE ORG. (2016), 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm. 
 19.  See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, From “Member-Driven Governance” to Constitutionally 
Limited “Multilevel Trade Governance” in the WTO, in THE WTO AT TEN: THE CONTRIBUTION OF 
THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 86, 104-105 (Giorgio Sacerdoti et al. eds. 2006) (discussing the 
importance of general principles of law in WTO jurisprudence). 
 20.  Id. at 105. 
 21.  Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 
I.L.M. 1144 (1994), Preamble [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement].  
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Body has also endeavored to introduce and consistently apply certain basic 
principles to the various WTO agreements.22 
B. Protectionism 
Free trade principles, however, are not the only underlying logic of trade 
law. While free trade may enhance the economic welfare of the world as a 
whole, it may also result in concentrated costs for certain segments of a society 
that have outsized incentives to lobby against free trade.23 This requires trade 
law to incorporate many policies that are protectionist in nature in order to 
soften resistance from parties who would stand to lose from trade 
liberalization.24 
Protectionist considerations, therefore, become a constant feature of trade 
law. Instead of unilaterally reducing trade barriers, which is supposedly in the 
interests of the liberalizing countries even if other countries do not reciprocate, 
GATT-WTO member countries wield trade barriers as bargaining chips that will 
be given away only on a reciprocal basis.25 Specific examples of protectionist 
policies can be found in the textile and agricultural sectors, where trade law has 
deviated from rule-based principles to accommodate political needs.26 Examples 
of protectionism are so numerous that Raj Bhala goes as far as arguing that there 
is no such thing as free trade because “a careful read of any trade agreement 
reveals . . . express carve-outs for certain preferred sectors, intricate and 
protective rules of origin, lengthy phase-in periods for trade-liberalizing 
obligations, and lengthy phase-out periods for trade barriers.”27 
These two opposing considerations—free trade principles and 
protectionism—create a fundamental tension in trade law. Protectionism stands 
for the opposite of almost everything that free trade principles promote. Whereas 
free trade principles liberalize trade, protectionism restricts it; whereas free trade 
 
 22.  See Gabrielle Marceau, Balance and Coherence by the WTO Appellate Body: Who Could 
Do Better?, in THE WTO AT TEN: THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 326, 
326-33 (Giorgio Sacerdoti et al. eds. 2006).  
 23.  BERNARD M. HOEKMAN & MICHEL M. KOSTECKI, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE 
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: THE WTO AND BEYOND 27-28 (2d ed. 2001). 
 24.  One example of such protectionist policies incorporated in trade law is antidumping, 
which functions as a safety valve to alleviate pressures resulting from trade liberalization. See J. 
Michael Finger et al., Antidumping As Safeguard Policy (World Bank, Policy Research Working 
Paper No. 2730, 2001) (discussing the weaknesses of antidumping as a safeguard mechanism); 
Wentong Zheng, Reforming Trade Remedies, 34 MICH. J. INT’L L. 151, 163-67 (2012). 
 25.  See Rachel Brewster, Pricing Compliance: When Formal Remedies Displace 
Reputational Sanctions, 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. 259, 308 n.218 (2013); Sungjoon Cho & Claire R. 
Kelly, Are World Trading Rules Passe? VA. J. INT’L L. 623, 632 (2013) (arguing that the basic 
architecture of the GATT betrays a merchantilist nature because tariff reductions under the GATT 
are based on reciprocal bargains).  
 26.  See Peter M. Gerhart, Slow Transformation: The WTO as a Distributive Organization, 17 
AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1045, 1059 (2002). 
 27.  Raj Bhala, Assessing the Modern Era of International Trade, 21 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 
1647, 1657-58 (1998). 
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/bjil/vol34/iss2/3
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principles disrupt existing trade patterns, protectionism preserves them; whereas 
free trade principles value systemic coherence, protectionism favors ad hoc 
solutions. As a practical matter, trade law becomes the compromise of these two 
opposing considerations.28 
II. 
BALANCE DISRUPTED: TRADE LAW’S RESPONSES TO CHINA 
The conceptualization of trade law as a balance between two opposing 
considerations—free trade principles and protectionism—lays the basic 
framework for analyzing trade law’s responses to the emergence of China as a 
disruptive force in world trade. The exponential growth in Chinese exports dealt 
a major external shock to the world trade system and dislodged trade law from 
the delicate balance it managed to maintain prior to China’s rise. As will be 
discussed in detail below, in almost all major areas where trade law authorizes 
protective measures against import surges, including antidumping, 
countervailing duties, safeguards, and managed trade, trade law tolerated 
deviations from its own fundamental principles as a way of preserving the 
structural stability of the world trade system. The discussions to follow 
document such deviations and tell a story of trade law losing its balance in 
response to a powerful, disruptive newcomer. 
A. Antidumping 
Arguably the most important trade-remedy instrument authorized by trade 
law, antidumping provides a mechanism for an importing country to impose 
special duties on imports from specific countries without violating the importing 
country’s obligations under global trade rules.29 Article VI of GATT 1947 
defines dumping as the introduction of one country’s products into the 
commerce of another country at “less than the normal value” of the products.30 
Article VI allows an importing country to levy an antidumping duty “not greater 
in amount than the margin of dumping”31 if dumping “causes or threatens 
material injury to an established industry” or “materially retards the 
establishment of a domestic industry” in the importing country.32 Subsequent to 
 
 28.  Besides the free trade-versus-protectionism compromise, trade law could reflect 
compromises along other dimensions as well. One compromise that has been the subject of intense 
scholarly attention is the compromise between trade law and national sovereignty. See, e.g., John H. 
Jackson, The Great 1994 Sovereignty Debate: United States Acceptance and Implementation of the 
Uruguay Round Results, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 157 (1997). This Article focuses on the free-
trade-versus-protectionism compromise as it is most relevant for analyzing how trade law responded 
to the rise of China. 
 29.  For an overview of antidumping, see Zheng, supra note 24, at 159-81. 
 30.  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 
I.L.M. 1153 (1994), art. VI:1 [hereinafter GATT 1994]. 
 31.  Id. art. VI:2.  
 32.  Id. art. VI:1. 
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GATT 1947, antidumping was further affirmed as a legitimate trade policy tool 
in the 1967 and 1979 Antidumping Codes and then, upon the establishment of 
the WTO in 1995, in the WTO Antidumping Agreement.33 
The idea of antidumping itself is a compromise between free trade 
principles and protectionism. The conventional rationale offered for 
antidumping is that dumping is an unfair trade practice.34 This “unfair trade” 
narrative, however, has been extensively critiqued in the academic literature as 
lacking sound economic bases.35 Scholars have instead argued that antidumping 
should be better viewed as a safety valve that allows importing countries to limit 
the adverse impact of surging imports on domestic industries.36 Without this 
safety valve, the logic goes, countries would be reluctant to make a free trade 
commitment in the first place.37 
Aruguably, therefore, antidumping is by design a protectionist tool aimed at 
maintaining orderly trade, not free trade. The immediate goal of antidumping is 
contrary to that of free trade, but in the grand scheme of trade policy, 
antidumping is a necessary evil that must be tolerated for the sake of facilitating 
free trade.38 To accomplish this higher goal, a delicate balance must be struck 
where antidumping will be allowed to function, yet not to the extent that it 
jeopardizes the rule-based world trade system. 
 
 33.  See Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI, June 30, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 4348, 
T.I.A.S. 6431 [hereinafter 1967 Antidumping Code]; Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 4919, T.I.A.S. 9650 
[hereinafter 1979 Antidumping Code]; Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 U.N.T.S. 201 [hereinafter WTO Antidumping Agreement]. 
 34.  See An Introduction to U.S. Trade Remedies, U.S. INT’L TRADE ADMIN., 
http://enforcement.trade.gov/intro/ (last visited July 31, 2016) (characterizing antidumping as a law 
that protects businesses from unfair competition resulting from unfair pricing by foreign companies).  
 35.  See, e.g., John J. Barceló III, Antidumping Laws As Barriers to Trade—The United States 
and the International Antidumping Code, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 491, 502–13 (1972) (rejecting the 
arguments that dumping is an “unfair trade practice,” confers an “artificial advantage,” “exploit[s] 
monopoly power,” and “inflict[s] injurious adjustment costs”); Raj Bhala, Rethinking Antidumping 
Law, 29 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 1, 8-21 (1995) (criticizing the economic rationales of 
antidumping); Reid M. Bolton, Antidumping and Distrust: Reducing Anti-dumping Duties Under the 
W.T.O. Through Heightened Scrutiny, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 66, 71–74 (2011) (rejecting various 
economic justifications for antidumping); Sungjoon Cho, Anticompetitive Trade Remedies: How 
Antidumping Measures Obstruct Market Competition, 87 N.C. L. REV. 357, 370–76 (2009) 
(criticizing the “unfair trade” rationale of antidumping); DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, FREE TRADE UNDER 
FIRE 162 (3d ed. 2009) (arguing that international price discrimination is neither unfair nor a 
problem unless it harms competition). 
 36.  See, e.g., Finger, supra note 24. 
 37.  For discussions of antidumping as a safety valve, see Zheng, supra note 29, at 163-67. 
 38.  See Luz Elena Reyes de la Torre & Jorge G. Gonzalez, Antidumping and Safeguard 
Measures in the Political Economy of Liberalization: The Mexican Case, in SAFEGUARDS AND 
ANTIDUMPING IN LATIN AMERICAN TRADE LIBERALIZATION: FIGHTING FIRE WITH FIRE 205, 243 (J. 
Michael Finger & Julio J. Nogues eds., 2006) (“On many occasions, high-ranking officials stated 
that the trade defense system was a necessary evil, but that it should be kept under strict control 
through its professionalization and the development of its methods and regulations.”). 
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/bjil/vol34/iss2/3
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15779/Z38CS1Z
2016] TRADE LAW’S RESPONSES TO THE RISE OF CHINA 117 
Trade law’s balancing act regarding antidumping was already difficult 
enough before China upended the prevailing world trade order.39 With the 
emergence of China as a major participant in world trade, the protectionist 
element of antidumping has been stretched far and wide to mitigate the impact 
of China, to a point that threatens the integrity of the rule-based world trade 
system.40 As will be detailed below, the rise of China has accentuated tensions 
between antidumping and global trade rules in two prominent respects: the use 
of “surrogate values” in calculating antidumping duties and the resort to 
country-wide antidumping duty rates. 
1. Surrogate Values 
Under Article VI of the GATT, antidumping duties are calculated on the 
basis of a comparison between the price at which the subject merchandise is sold 
in the importing jurisdiction and the “normal value” of such merchandise.41 
Dumping arises if the price of the product exported from one country to another 
is less than “the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the like 
product when destined for consumption in the exporting country.”42 When the 
home-market price of the product is unavailable, dumping arises if the price of 
the product is less than “either . . . the highest comparable price for the like 
product for export to any third country in the ordinary course of trade, or . . . the 
cost of production of the product in the country of origin plus a reasonable 
addition for selling cost and profit.”43 Obviously, these provisions envision the 
use of actual prices or costs of the allegedly dumped product in its home market 
or third-country markets as the gauge of its normal value. 
Drafters of the GATT, however, were well aware that actual prices or costs 
would not provide a proper basis for comparison when such prices or costs were 
not determined by market forces. In Ad Article VI,44 the GATT recognizes that 
“in the case of imports from a country which has a complete or substantially 
complete monopoly of its trade and where all domestic prices are fixed by the 
State, special difficulties may exist in determining price comparability” for 
 
 39.  Over the years, the world trade community has struggled to put constraints on the use of 
antidumping for the sake of procedural fairness and predictability. For example, one issue that has 
divided the world trade community is the issue of zeroing in antidumping—the practice of 
artificially inflating dumping margins by treating negative dumping margins for product subgroups 
as zero. See Chad Bown & Thomas J. Prusa, U.S. Antidumping: Much Ado about Zeroing (World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper 5352), http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-
9450-5352.  
 40.  As discussed earlier, the strong consensus in the academic literature is that antidumping 
lacks integrity at a fundamental level, given that what it purports to remedy is not unfair except in 
very limited circumstances. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 41.  GATT 1994, supra note 30, art. VI:1(a). 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Id. art. VI:1(b). 
 44.  The “Ad” articles of the GATT are the interpretive notes accompanying the GATT 
articles. See Carol J. Beyers, The U.S./Mexico Tuna Embargo Dispute: a Case Study of the GATT 
and Environmental Progress, 16 MD. J. INT’L L. 229, 237 n.68 (1992). 
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purposes of the dumping analysis.45 In such cases, Ad Article VI authorizes an 
importing country to “take into account the possibility that a strict comparison 
with domestic prices in such a country may not always be appropriate.”46 It does 
not specify, however, exactly how to take this possibility into account, leaving 
the door open to policy innovations on the part of GATT contracting parties. 
Arguably, the GATT’s recognition of the need for special treatment of 
imports from state-controlled economies makes logical sense. If antidumping 
duties measure the underpricing of a product, they should not be based on home-
market prices artificially set by a government for “social and political 
engineering” purposes.47 Otherwise, one effective way to circumvent 
antidumping duties would be for a government to use its unlimited financial 
power to set home-market prices at artificially low levels.48 
The flexibility allowed under the GATT for imports from nonmarket 
economies (NMEs) soon found its use in the Cold War era. Beginning in the 
1960s, the U.S. Treasury Department, the agency responsible for antidumping 
investigations in the United States at the time, began experimenting with a 
special antidumping methodology for imports from the Soviet Union and 
Eastern European countries.49 Rejecting the home market prices in those 
countries as being state-controlled, the U.S. Treasury Department used the home 
market or export prices of the same or similar products produced in countries 
where the relevant product markets were not state-controlled, primarily Western 
European countries, as the basis of comparison with U.S. prices in calculating 
antidumping duties.50 This practice was subsequently recognized by section 
205(c) of the Trade Act of 1974, which provided that the “foreign market 
value”—the U.S. term at the time for “normal value”—of a product from a state-
 
 45.  GATT 1994, supra note 30, ad art. VI. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  See Robert A. Anthony, The American Response to Dumping from Capitalist and 
Socialist Economies—Substantive Premises, and Restructured Procedures After the 1967 GATT 
Code, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 159, 204 (1969) (“Prices in a ‘controlled’ economy are often the 
instruments of social and political engineering, and may be set at artificial levels for reasons having 
nothing to do with natural economic relationships as those would be judged in a free-market 
economy.”).  
 48.  Id.  
 49.  See, e.g., Bicycles from Czechoslovakia, 25 Fed. Reg. 6657 (1960); Jalousie-Louvre-
Sized Sheet Glass from Czechoslovakia, 27 Fed. Reg. 8457 (1962); Portland Cement from Poland, 
28 Fed. Reg. 6660 (1963); Window Glass from U.S.S.R., 29 Fed. Reg. 8381 (1964); Fur Felt Hoods, 
Bodies, and Caps from Czechoslovakia, 31 Fed. Reg. 15,024 (1966); Cast Iron Soil Pipe and Fittings 
from Poland, 32 Fed. Reg. 2901, 8250 (1967); Pig Iron from East Germany, 33 Fed. Reg. 5105, 
9375 (1968); Titanium Sponge from the U.S.S.R., 33 Fed. Reg. 5467, 5960, 6377 (1968).  
 50.  Anthony, supra note 47, at 200-201. For more detailed descriptions of the Treasury 
Department’s antidumping practices for imports from the former Soviet Union and Eastern European 
countries in the 1960s, see Alexis C. Coudert, The Application of the United States Antidumping Act 
in Light of a Liberal Trade Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 189, 224-27 (1965); Comment, U.S. Trade 
Laws Hinder the Development of U.S.-P.R.C. Trade, 22 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 135, 146-49 
(1983) [hereinafter U.S.-P.R.C. Trade]; Peter Buck Feller, The Antidumping Act and the East-West 
Trade, 66 MICH. L. REV. 115, 126-33 (1967). 
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controlled-economy country should be determined on the basis of either the 
price at which the same or similar merchandise of a non-state-controlled-
economy country is sold for domestic consumption or exports to other countries, 
or the constructed value of the same or similar merchandise in a non-state-
controlled-economy country.51 
The sound logic of this surrogate-value approach, however, coincides with 
a grave potential for unfair treatment. Producers from NME countries could 
exert little control over the amount of antidumping duties imposed on their 
products, given that it is not their own prices or costs, but prices or costs from 
surrogate countries, that matter in the antidumping process.52 
This potential for unfair treatment was most vividly on display in 1975 in 
Electric Golf Cars from Poland, in which a Polish golf car manufacturer was 
found to have dumped its products in the United States, first based on the sales 
prices of a small Canadian producer53 and then later, based on the sales prices of 
a U.S. producer.54 Using U.S. producers’ prices as the basis of normal value 
effectively barred the import of these products, as imported products would have 
to be sold at a higher price than the same or similar U.S. products when 
transportation costs are taken into account.55 
The nonsensical outcome in Electric Golf Cars from Poland prompted the 
U.S. Treasury Department to rectify the most unreasonable elements of its 
surrogate-country methodology by promulgating a new antidumping regulation 
in 1978.56 The 1978 regulation prioritized the use of prices or constructed values 
from third countries whose stages of economic development were comparable to 
that of the exporting state-controlled-economy country.57 When the foreign 
market value of the allegedly dumped product had to be constructed from the 
costs of producing the product, the 1978 regulation required that the actual 
amounts of the factors of production incurred by the specific NME producer in 
producing the product be used in calculating the constructed value, although 
such factors of production would still be valued using prices taken from 
surrogate countries.58 These provisions reduced the arbitrariness inherent in the 
 
 51.  See Pub. L. No. 93-618, Title III, § 321, 88 Stat. 1978 (repealed, Trade Agreements Act of 
1979, Pub. L. 96-39, Title I, § 106, 93 Stat. 144). For more discussions of section 205(c) of the 
Trade Act of 1974, see Comment, Dumping by State-Controlled-Economy Countries: The Polish 
Golf Cart Case and the New Treasury Regulations, 128 U. PENN. L. REV. 217, 224-27 (1979) 
[hereinafter Dumping by SCE Countries]. 
 52.  See id. at 224-25. 
 53.  See Electric Golf Cars from Poland, 40 Fed. Reg. 25,497, 25497 (1975). 
 54.  See Letter from Carl W. Schwarz, Counsel for Melex USA, Inc., to Representative 
Charles A. Vanik, Chairman of the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means 
(Apr. 27, 1979), reprinted in Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 734, 735 (1979).  
 55.  See Dumping by SCE Countries, supra note 51, at 229. 
 56.  See 43 Fed. Reg. 35,262, 35265 (Aug. 9, 1978).  
 57.  19 C.F.R. § 153.7(b) (1979) (setting forth a hierarchy of three alternative methods for 
measuring the foreign market value of merchandise from state-controlled-economy countries).  
 58.  19 C.F.R. § 153.7(c). The 1978 regulation used the term “specific objective components 
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NME methodology and, for the first time, granted NME producers some limited 
abilities to predict and control their antidumping exposure. 
It was against this backdrop that China came on the antidumping scene. In 
the late 1970s, shortly after China embarked on its ambitious economic reform 
programs, trade between China and Western countries began to increase 
rapidly.59 In 1981, in Natural Menthol from China, the first-ever antidumping 
action filed in the United States against a Chinese product, the U.S. Commerce 
Department (USDOC) 60 rejected Chinese domestic menthol prices as a 
benchmark for measuring antidumping duties for Chinese menthol exported to 
the United States because the Chinese prices were state-controlled.61 In so 
doing, the USDOC entertained, but eventually rejected, the Chinese 
respondents’ argument that China’s state control in the particular economic 
sector in question—the agricultural sector—was not to such an extent that would 
disqualify Chinese menthol prices from being considered in antidumping 
investigations.62 The USDOC then went on to use prices of menthol exported 
from Paraguay to the United States as the basis for calculating antidumping 
duties for Chinese menthol.63 Subsequent to the Chinese menthol case, in the 
1980s, the USDOC routinely treated China as a state-controlled-economy 
country and used prices from surrogate countries to calculate antidumping duties 
for Chinese products.64 
By then, however, China did not appear to be receiving a higher level of 
scrutiny from antidumping authorities than other state-controlled-economy 
countries, to which the same surrogate-country methodology was regularly 
applied.65 After all, as of the 1980s, China’s potential as a disruptive force in 
 
or factors of production” to refer to the actual amounts of the factors of production used in producing 
the allegedly dumped product. See id. 
 59.  The volume of bilateral trade between China and the United States, for example, increased 
from $374 million in 1977 to $5.49 billion in 1981. See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, INT’L TRADE 
ADMIN., FOREIGN ECONOMIC TRENDS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES—CHINA, 
FET 82-112 (1982). 
 60.  In January 1980, President Jimmy Carter transferred the responsibility for conducting 
antidumping investigations from the Treasury Department to the Commerce Department. See 
William P. Alford, When is China Paraguay? An Examination of the Application of the Antidumping 
and Countervailing Duty Laws of the United States to China and Other “Nonmarket Economy” 
Nations, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 79, 88 n.51 (1987). 
 61.  See Antidumping, Natural Menthol from the People’s Republic of China; Final 
Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, 46 Fed. Reg. 24614, 24614 (Dep’t of Comm. May 
1, 1981) [hereinafter Chinese Menthol Final USDOC Determination].  
 62.  See Natural Menthol from the People’s Republic of China; Antidumping—Preliminary 
Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value and Suspension of Liquidation, 46 Fed. Reg. 3258, 
3258-60 (Dep’t of Comm. Jan. 14, 1981) [hereinafter Chinese Menthol Preliminary USDOC 
Determination].  
 63.  See Chinese Menthol Final USDOC Determination, supra note 61, at 24,614. 
 64.  The countries that were used as China’s surrogate included Thailand, the Dominican 
Republic, Colombia, Pakistan, Singapore, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, and Spain. See Alford, 
supra note 59, at 89. 
 65.  Id. 
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world trade was not fully visible, obviating any need for aggressive, 
nonconventional antidumping policy aimed specifically at China. 
During the late 1980s, with no NME countries posing an existential threat 
to the world trade order,66 the constant tug-of-war between free trade principles 
and protectionism within trade law continued to tip in the direction of the former 
in the area of NME methodology. In the United States, the 1988 Omnibus Trade 
and Competitiveness Act modified the NME methodology used by the USDOC, 
making the constructed value of the factors of production of the NME product 
the preferred method of measuring the normal value of the product.67 Only when 
the information necessary for calculating the constructed value of the factors of 
production was unavailable would the USDOC be allowed to measure the 
normal value of the NME product on the basis of the price at which the same or 
similar product was sold in a surrogate country. 68 
In implementing the new NME methodology under the 1988 law for 
Chinese producers, the USDOC initially showed much greater flexibility than 
the statute required. In 1991, in Oscillating Fans and Ceiling Fans from the 
People’s Republic of China, the USDOC adopted a “mix-and-match” approach 
for NME prices and stated that if it could be established that inputs purchased in 
an NME were purchased at market-oriented prices, such actual prices might be 
substituted for surrogate-country values in the factors-of-production analysis.69 
Later in the same year, in Chrome-Plated Lug Nuts from the People’s Republic 
of China, the USDOC again confirmed the mix-and-match approach, stating that 
“for certain inputs into the production process, market forces may be at work.”70 
That would be the case, according to the USDOC, if inputs were imported from 
suppliers in market economy countries, or if market forces were at work “in 
determining the prices for locally-sourced goods in the nonmarket economy.”71 
In these cases, the USDOC believed that “it is appropriate to use those prices in 
lieu of values of a surrogate, market-economy producer, because they are 
market-driven prices and they reflect the producer’s actual experience.”72 In an 
implicit admission to the drawbacks of the surrogate-country method, the 
USDOC further stated that “[t]here is nothing to be gained in terms of accuracy, 
 
 66.  During this time period, the country perceived to be posing the largest threat to the 
existing world trade order was Japan, which, despite its hierarchical economic structures, was not 
considered an NME country. 
 67.  See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(1)(1989).  
 68.  See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(2) .  
 69.  Oscillating Fans and Ceiling Fans from the People’s Republic of China, 56 Fed. Reg. 
25,664, 25,667 (Dep’t of Comm. Jun. 5, 1991) (preliminary determinations of sales at less than fair 
value).  
 70.  Chrome-Plated Lug Nuts from the People’s Republic of China, 56 Fed. Reg. 46,153, 
46,154 (Dep’t of Comm. Sept. 10, 1991) (final determination of sales at less than fair value).  
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id. 
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fairness, or predictability in using surrogate values when market-determined 
values exists in the NME country.”73 
The USDOC’s push to rationalize the surrogate-value method, however, 
led to tensions between antidumping and another area of trade law—
countervailing duty law. A parallel trade remedy instrument authorized under 
global trade rules, countervailing duty law allows an importing country to 
impose special countervailing duties on imported products to offset subsidies 
conferred by foreign governments on such products.74 Prior to the 1990s, the 
USDOC took the position that a subsidy was “any action that distorts or subverts 
the market process and results in a misallocation of resources.”75 Because 
markets were fictitious in NME countries in the first place, subsidies “have no 
meaning” in such countries.76 But when the USDOC began recognizing some 
prices in China as being driven by market forces, United States petitioners 
wasted no time in reviving the argument that countervailing duty law should 
begin to apply to Chinese products in market-oriented sectors.77 
Apparently reluctant to change its long-standing practice of not applying 
countervailing duty law to imports from NMEs, the USDOC retreated from 
using actual Chinese prices as the comparison basis in antidumping. In Sulfanilic 
Acid from the People’s Republic of China in 1992, the USDOC announced three 
criteria for determining whether an NME producer operates within a market-
oriented industry in the NME: (1) there must be virtually no government 
involvement in setting prices or amounts to be produced for the merchandise 
under investigation; (2) the industry producing the merchandise under 
investigation should be characterized by private or collective ownership; and (3) 
market-determined prices must be paid for “all significant inputs, whether 
material or non-material, and for an all but insignificant proportion of all the 
inputs accounting for the total value of the merchandise under investigation.”78 
If these conditions were not met, the producer would be treated as an NME 
producer and surrogate prices or costs from third countries would be used to 
calculate the normal value of the merchandise under investigation.79 Once the 
NME producer failed this market-oriented-industry test, the USDOC would 
effectively no longer grant requests to evaluate whether individual inputs used 
 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  See GATT 1994, supra note 30, art. VI:3. 
 75.  Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Poland, 49 Fed. Reg. 19,374, 19375 (Dep’t of Comm. May 
7, 1984) (final negative countervailing duty determination).  
 76.  Id. (“It is this fundamental distinction—that in an NME system the government does not 
interfere in the market process, but supplants it—that has led us to conclude that subsidies have no 
meaning outside the context of a market economy.”).  
 77.  See Oscillating Fans and Ceiling Fans from the People’s Republic of China, 56 Fed. Reg. 
57,616 (Dep’t of Comm. Nov. 13, 1991) (initiation of countervailing duty investigations); Chrome 
Plated Lug Nuts from the People’s Republic of China, 57 Fed. Reg. 877 (Dep’t of Comm. Jan. 9, 
1992) (initiation of countervailing duty investigations).  
 78.  Sulfanilic Acid from the People’s Republic of China, 57 Fed. Reg. 9409, 9411 (Dep’t of 
Comm. Mar. 18, 1992) (preliminary determination of sales at less than fair value).  
 79.  Id.  
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by the producer were sourced from within the NME in accordance with market 
principles.80 In so doing, the USDOC ushered in an all-or-nothing approach to 
replace the mix-and-match approach it used only months before in Oscillating 
Fans and Ceiling Fans and Chrome Plated Lug Nuts. 
After abandoning the mix-and-match approach, the USDOC moved to 
terminate the pending countervailing duty proceedings against Chinese 
producers, on the grounds that the Chinese industries in question were not 
market-oriented.81 For the next twenty-five years, antidumping would become 
the sole remedy against low-priced Chinese imports.82 In the meantime, the 
USDOC strictly applied the market-oriented industry test in antidumping 
proceedings involving Chinese products, resulting in a de facto rule under which 
surrogate values were used for all Chinese producers. 
For the time being, the USDOC managed to defuse a crisis in trade law as it 
applied to China. One could disagree with the USDOC about the soundness of 
its judgment that Chinese industries were still not market-oriented despite 
progress in market reforms in China. But, at least the USDOC’s policy towards 
China was internally consistent. If market forces were not strong enough in 
China to allow Chinese prices to be used as the comparison basis in 
antidumping, they should not be strong enough to give rise to subsidies, which 
are a meaningful concept only if there are real markets to deviate from. At the 
time, the USDOC was able to rely on antidumping as the exclusive remedy for 
Chinese imports in part because in the early 1990s, the level of import protection 
offered by antidumping—with the help of the surrogate-value method—was 
adequate to cope with China’s burgeoning, yet still not dominating, export 
prowess. This would change twenty-five years later, when China’s threat to the 
global trade order and the pressure to counteract it were in full swing.83 As 
 
 80.  In Sulfanilic Acid, the Chinese respondent argued that the prices at which it purchased 
some of its inputs were not subject to state control and were market driven. Id. The USDOC rejected 
this argument by citing the lack of documentary evidence indicating that market forces were at work 
for those inputs. Id. Subsequently, in its amended final determination in Chrome Plated Lug Nuts in 
response to court remand, the USDOC made clear that once it was shown that one significant input 
was not purchased at a market-determined price, “there [was] no need to reach a similar 
determination with respect to any other significant inputs.” Chrome Plated Lug Nuts, 57 Fed. Reg. 
15,052, 15053 (Dep’t of Comm. Apr. 24, 1992) (amendment to final determination of sales at less 
than fair value and amendment to antidumping order). 
 81.  See Oscillating and Ceiling Fans from the People’s Republic of China, 57 Fed. Reg. 
24,018, 24019 (Dep’t of Comm. Jun. 5, 1992) (final negative countervailing duty determinations) 
(“Therefore, we have determined that the PRC fan industry is not an MOI. As a result, we determine 
that the CVD law cannot be applied to the PRC fan industry.”); Chrome-Plated Lug Nuts and Wheel 
Locks from the People’s Republic of China, 57 Fed. Reg. 10,459, 10460 (Dep’t of Comm. Mar. 26, 
1992) (rescission of initiation of countervailing duty investigation and dismissal of petition) (“[W]e 
determine that the PRC producers of lug nuts are nonmarket economy producers to which the 
countervailing duty law cannot be applied.”).  
 82.  This changed in 2007, when the USDOC applied countervailing duty law to Chinese 
products, citing changes that occurred in the Chinese economy. See infra Part II.B.1 for more 
discussions. 
 83.  The trade deficit of the United States with China grew to $258 billion in 2007. See Trade 
in Goods with China, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Sept. 04, 2014), 
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discussed in more detail below, escalating protectionist pressures eventually 
resulted in a more dramatic response to Chinese exports, a response that entailed 
the simultaneous imposition of antidumping duties calculated using the NME 
methodology and countervailing duties on Chinese products at the expense of 
trade law’s internal logic and coherence.84 
The use of surrogate values in antidumping proceedings involving Chinese 
products has been sanctioned by global trade rules. Upon the establishment of 
the WTO in 1994, global trade rules inherited the basic framework laid under 
the GATT for handling antidumping for NME producers. The WTO 
Antidumping Agreement, enacted to interpret and implement Article VI of the 
GATT, contained no explicit references to the use of surrogate values for 
imports from NME countries.85 Therefore, Ad Article VI of the GATT 1947, 
which was now incorporated into the GATT 1994, remained the only explicit 
provision in the WTO’s founding legal documents on the surrogate-value issue. 
The absence of the surrogate-value issue in the WTO Antidumping Agreement 
indicates that by 1994, WTO members perhaps did not consider the threats from 
NME countries to be grave enough to warrant heightened attention to the 
surrogate-value issue, given that the communist regimes in the former Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe collapsed several years earlier and that China’s 
export machines were just beginning to rev up. 
This changed when China gained WTO membership in 2001, by which 
time China’s surging exports, along with the prospect of even greater market 
access afforded by WTO membership, forced existing WTO members to 
explicitly authorize the use of surrogate values for Chinese products in China’s 
WTO accession documents. Paragraph 15(a) of the China Accession Protocol 
states that “[i]n determining price comparability under Article VI of the GATT 
1994 and the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the importing WTO Member shall use 
either Chinese prices or costs for the industry under investigation or a 
methodology that is not based on a strict comparison with domestic prices or 
costs in China.”86 Paragraph 15(a)(ii) further provides that the use of non-
Chinese prices or costs would be allowed if “the producers under investigation 
cannot clearly show that market economy conditions prevail in the industry 
producing the like product with regard to manufacture, production and sale of 
that product.”87 Paragraph 15(a)(ii), however, is set to expire fifteen years after 
the date of China’s accession.88 
 
http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html. 
 84.  See infra Part II.B.1. 
 85.  See Chad P. Bown & Petros C. Mavroidis, One (Firm) Is Not Enough: A Legal-Economic 
Analysis of EC-Fasteners, 12 WORLD TRADE REV. 243, 255 (2013). 
 86.  Accession of the People’s Republic of China, Decision of 10 November 2001, WT/L/432 
(Nov. 23, 2001), art. 15(a) [hereinafter China Accession Protocol]. 
 87.  Id. art. 15(a)(ii). 
 88.  Id. art. 15(d). There are fierce debates on the legal consequences of the expiration of 
Paragraph 15(a)(ii).  See infra notes 291-297 and accompanying text.  
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Like Ad Article VI of the GATT, Paragraph 15(a) of the China Accession 
Protocol only states that surrogate values could be used for Chinese products, 
but does not elaborate on how they should be used. The lack of specifics in the 
GATT and the China Accession Protocol affords WTO member countries wide 
latitude in the use of surrogate values and therefore preserves flexible policy 
space for handling antidumping for Chinese imports. In 2011, a WTO Dispute 
Settlement Panel affirmed this flexible policy space in EU-Footwear. In this 
case China challenged the European Commission’s surrogate-country selection 
procedure and its selection of Brazil as the surrogate country for antidumping 
investigations involving imports of Chinese footwear.89 Because there are no 
WTO rules on the procedure or criteria for the selection of a surrogate country,90 
China could only assert that the European Union’s surrogate-country selection 
procedure violated its general obligations under other WTO provisions. In 
particular, China claimed that the EU had violated Article 2.4 of the WTO 
Antidumping Agreement, which requires a “fair comparison” between the 
export price and the normal value in calculating antidumping duties.91 The WTO 
Panel rejected this argument, stating that Article 2.4 of the WTO Antidumping 
Agreement only concerns the comparison of the export price and the normal 
value after the component elements of the comparison have already been 
established. 92 
2. Country-Wide Rates 
In addition to the use of surrogate values, the protectionist pressures to 
contain China’s exports in the multilateral trading system led to another policy 
innovation by importing countries: the use of country-wide, instead of company-
specific, antidumping duty rates. As discussed below, this policy innovation, 
when coupled with the use of adverse facts available, results in much higher 
antidumping rates, effectively serving the protectionist needs of importing 
countries. However, the policy innovation has a tenuous legal basis in trade law. 
As discussed below, China successfully challenged the use of country-wide 
antidumping rates for its products before the WTO as being inconsistent with 
WTO rules. When asked to choose between preserving the integrity of the rule-
 
 89.  See Report of the Panel, European Union-Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Footwear 
from China, WT/DS405/R (Oct. 28, 2011). The European Commission selected Brazil as the 
surrogate country in the underlying investigations despite the Chinese parties’ argument that 
Thailand, India, or Indonesia would be a more suitable surrogate country than Brazil. See id. ¶¶ 
7.254-.255. 
 90.  China Accession Protool, supra note 86, ¶ 7.258.  
 91.  Id. ¶ 7.261. China argued that this “fair comparison” requirement is an independent 
obligation that applies to all aspects of the establishment of normal value, including the selection of 
a surrogate country. Id. 
 92.  Id. ¶ 7.263 (“[I]t is clear that the requirement to make a fair comparison in Article 2.4 
logically presupposes that normal value and export price, the elements to be compared, have already 
been established.”). The WTO Panel also rejected China’s other arguments that the EU’s surrogate-
country selection procedure violated Articles 2.1 and 17.6(1) of the WTO Antidumping Agreement. 
See id. ¶¶ 7.259-.260. 
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based world trade system and granting sufficient policy leeway to protect the 
status quo, the WTO opted for the former. 
By way of background, Article 6.10 of the WTO Antidumping Agreement 
requires that “[antidumping] authorities shall, as a rule, determine an individual 
margin of dumping for each known exporter or producer concerned of the 
product under investigation.”93 The authorities may deviate from this 
requirement if “the number of exporters, producers, importers or types of 
products involved is so large as to make such a determination impracticable.”94 
In such cases, the authorities are allowed to “limit their examination either to a 
reasonable number of interested parties or products by using samples . . . , or to 
the largest percentage of the volume of the exports from the country in question 
which can reasonably be investigated.”95 
In the late 1980s—a period that predated the WTO Antidumping 
Agreement—United States petitioners began making the argument that a 
country-wide antidumping duty rate should be assigned to Chinese producers or 
exporters who could not demonstrate an absence of government control over 
their business operations. In Certain Headwear from the People’s Republic of 
China in 1989, for example, the U.S. petitioner argued that the Chinese 
government owned all trading companies in China and the establishment of 
company-specific rates with large variations “facilitates circumvention in a 
state-controlled economy where exports can be easily directed and diverted 
among the trading companies by the State.”96 The USDOC rejected this 
argument, stating that “[t]he former branches of the national trading companies 
have separated from the national companies and we found no evidence that the 
prices the branches charge for exports to the United States are set by or 
coordinated through the national trading companies.”97 The USDOC also noted 
that in past antidumping investigations, it always calculated separate rates for 
different Chinese national trading companies even though it treated China as a 
state-controlled economy.98 
In 1991, however, the USDOC made an about-face on the separate-rate 
issue and denied, for the first time, a request for separate rates by Chinese 
exporters. In Heavy Forged Hand Tools from the People’s Republic of China, 
the USDOC assigned one country-wide antidumping rate to three Chinese 
exporters that were former branches of a Chinese national trading company.99 
 
 93.  WTO Antidumping Agreement, supra note 33, art. 6.10. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Certain Headwear from the People’s Republic of China, 54 Fed. Reg. 11983, 11986 
(Dep’t of Comm. Mar. 23, 1989) (final determination of sales at less than fair value).  
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. (citing Shop Towels from the People’s Republic of China; Final Results of 
Administrative Review of Antidumping Duty Order (50 FR 26020, June 24, 1985)).  
 99.  See Heavy Forged Hand Tools, Finished or Unfinished, With or Without Handles, from 
the People’s Republic of China, 56 Fed. Reg. 241, 244 (Dep’t of Comm. Jan. 3, 1991) (final 
determinations of sales at less than fair value). 
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The USDOC asserted that the Chinese national trading company in question 
failed to submit adequate documentation of its claim that the three exporters 
were independent corporations.100 This failure, according to the USDOC, left 
“no alternative than to treat the three as branches of the same exporting 
entity.”101 
Shortly afterwards, the USDOC doubled-down on its denial of separate 
rates for Chinese exporters. In Iron Construction Castings from the People’s 
Republic of China, the USDOC assigned one country-wide antidumping rate to 
two exporters that were former branches of another Chinese national trading 
company.102 The assignment of a country-wide rate in this case is all the more 
striking as it reversed the USDOC’s preliminary decision in the same case to 
calculate separate rates for the two exporters.103 More significantly, the USDOC 
broadly stated in this case that in a state-controlled economy, “all entities are 
presumed to export under the control of the state” and this presumption can be 
rebutted only by “a clear showing of legal, financial and economic 
independence.”104 
Later in the same year, in Sparklers from the People’s Republic of China, 
the USDOC elaborated on its criteria for separate rates for exporters from NME 
countries.105 To qualify for company-specific rates, exporters from NME 
countries have to pass a two-pronged test by demonstrating “an absence of 
central government control, both in law and in fact, with respect to exports.”106 
For each of the two prongs of the test—referred to by the USDOC as “de jure 
absence of control” and “de facto absence of control”—the USDOC set forth a 
list of evidence supporting, but not requiring, a finding of absence of central 
control.107 
 
 100.  Id. The Chinese national trading company in question claimed that it was divided into 
seven independent corporations pursuant to a government order. The USDOC repeatedly requested a 
copy of the government order or other official Chinese government documentation at the time of or 
prior to the date of the order. The national trading company never submitted such documentation. 
See id.  
 101.  Id. 
 102.  See Iron Construction Castings from the People’s Republic of China, 56 Fed. Reg. 2742, 
2744 (Dep’t of Comm. Jan. 24, 1991) (Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review). 
 103.  See id. at 2743-44. The USDOC stated that after it made its preliminary decision to assign 
separate rates to the two exporters, “[s]ubsequent review of the information on the record has led us 
to reevaluate the claims made by [the two exporters] with respect to separation and independence 
from the national corporation.” Id. at 2743. This reevaluation found no information on the record 
indicating that “the national import/export corporations are independent from one another.” Id at 
2744.  
 104.  Id. 
 105.  See Sparklers from the People’s Republic of China, 56 Fed. Reg. 20,588, 20,589 (Dep’t of 
Comm. May 6, 1991) (Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value).  
 106.  Id. 
 107.  According to the USDOC: 
Evidence supporting, though not requiring, a finding of de jure absence of central 
control includes: (1) An absence of restrictive stipulations associated with an 
individual exporter’s business and export licenses; (2) any legislative enactments 
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By now, the USDOC’s rejection of separate rates for Chinese companies 
had progressed from a facts-based decision for specific companies to a 
presumed norm for all Chinese entities. From this point on, all Chinese 
companies, regardless of whether they had been historically part of the same 
national trading company, had to overcome the presumption of central 
government control in order to obtain separate antidumping rates.108 
Ironically, the move towards country-wide antidumping rates for Chinese 
companies took place at a time when China was undergoing rapid economic 
reforms that conferred higher degrees of independence from the government on 
Chinese firms.109 Arguably, the adoption of country-wide antidumping rates for 
Chinese products comports not with economic principles, but with protectionist 
policy needs. In calculating country-wide antidumping rates, the USDOC often 
relies on information provided by petitioners and inferences adverse to 
respondents.110 As a result, country-wide antidumping rates tend to be much 
 
decentralizing control of companies; or (3) any other formal measures by the 
government decentralizing control of companies. De facto absence of central 
government control with respect to exports is based on two prerequisites: (1) Whether 
each exporter sets its own export prices independently of the government and other 
exporters; and (2) whether each exporter can keep the proceeds from its sales. 
 Id. 
 108.  Subsequent to Sparklers, the USDOC tinkered with its separate-rate criteria as applied to 
Chinese companies. In Certain Compact Ductile Iron Waterworks Fittings and Accessories Thereof 
from the People’s Republic of China in 1993, the USDOC determined that state ownership per se 
precluded a finding of absence of government control. See 58 Fed. Reg. 37,908, 37,909 (Dep’t of 
Comm. Jul. 14, 1993) (Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value). According to the 
USDOC, “an entity cannot be completely free of central government control with respect to exports 
if it is owned by the central government, regardless of whether the indicia set forth in Sparklers have 
been met.” This deviation from the Sparklers test, however, was short-lived. In Silicon Carbide from 
the People’s Republic of China in 1994, the USDOC changed course and determined that “the 
ownership of [respondent companies] ‘by all the people,’ in and of itself, cannot be considered as 
dispositive in determining whether those companies can receive separate rates.” 59 Fed. Reg. 
22,585, 22,586 (Dep’t of Comm. May 2, 1994) (Notice of Final Determination of Sales at Less Than 
Fair Value). Therefore, a Chinese respondent could still receive a separate rate “if it establishes on a 
de jure and de facto basis that there is an absence of governmental control.” Id. at 22,587. The 
USDOC then amplified the Sparklers test by adding two factors to the de facto analysis: (1) whether 
the respondent has authority to negotiate and sign contracts and other agreements, and (2) whether 
the respondent has autonomy from the central government in making decisions regarding selection 
of management. Id. For more detailed discussions of the evolution of the USDOC’s separate-rate 
methodology, see Priya Alagiri, Reform, Reality, and Recognition: Reassessing U.S. Antidumping 
Policy Toward China, 26 L. & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1061, 1068-79 (1995).  
 109.  See Alagiri, supra note 108, at 1082-85 (discussing changes in the Chinese economy in 
1989-1994); see also Wentong Zheng, Transplanting Antitrust in China: Economic Transition, 
Market Structure, and State Control, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 643, 652-54, 662-67 (2010) (discussing 
price liberalization and reforms of state-owned enterprises in China).  
 110.  For Chinese respondents that have not demonstrated an absence of central government 
control, the USDOC relies on the Chinese government to identify them and to submit a consolidated 
questionnaire response on their behalf. But it is difficult for the Chinese government to persuade all 
exporters of the subject merchandise to provide information needed for the consolidated 
questionnaire response. See Alagiri, supra note 108, at 1068. The USDOC may base the country-
wide antidumping rate on adverse facts available when some exporters that are part of the NME-
wide entity do not respond to the antidumping questionnaire. See 2015 Antidumping Manual,  U.S. 
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higher than company-specific antidumping rates. According to a 2006 study by 
the U.S. Government Accountability Office, the USDOC imposed antidumping 
duties on the same product from both China and one or more market-economy 
countries in twenty-five cases.111 The average antidumping rate applied to 
Chinese companies in the twenty-five cases was over twenty percent higher than 
the average rate applied to market-economy companies.112 Much of this 
difference is attributable to the unusually high country-wide rates for Chinese 
companies. While company-specific rates for Chinese companies were similar to 
those assigned to market-economy companies, country-wide rates for Chinese 
companies were over sixty percent higher than comparable market-economy 
rates.113 
The main problem with country-wide antidumping rates, however, is that 
their legal basis is questionable. In 2009, China mounted its first attack on 
country-wide antidumping rates before the WTO in European Communities-
Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from 
China (EC-Fasteners).114 China argued, among other things, that the European 
Union’s imposition of country-wide antidumping rates on Chinese products 
solely because China is an NME country violated the EU’s obligations under the 
WTO Antidumping Agreement and other WTO agreements.115 
By way of background, the European Union operates an antidumping 
scheme similar to the country-wide antidumping rate scheme in place in the 
United States. Article 9(5) of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1225/2009 of 30 
November 2009 (EU Basic Antidumping Regulations) provides that when a 
supplier is from an NME country, the antidumping authority will specify an 
antidumping duty for the entire supplying country unless the supplier can 
demonstrate sufficient independence from the government.116 This is often 
referred to as the “Individual Treatment” test in EU antidumping law.117 
 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE IMPORT ADMINISTRATION at 7 (2015),  
http://enforcement.trade.gov/admanual/2015/Chapter%2010%20NME.pdf. 
 111.  UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, U.S.-CHINA TRADE: 
ELIMINATING NONMARKET ECONOMY METHODOLOGY WOULD LOWER ANTIDUMPING DUTIES FOR 
SOME CHINESE COMPANIES 16 (2006). 
 112.  Id. at 19. 
 113.  Id. at 20-21. 
 114.  See Request for Consultation, European Communities-Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures 
on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China, WT/DS397/1 (Aug. 4, 2009).  
 115.  Id. at 1-2. 
 116.  See Council Regulation (EC) No. 1225/2009 of 30 November 2009 on Protection Against 
Dumped Imports from Countries Not Members of the European Community, Art. 9(5) [hereinafter 
EU Basic Antidumping Regulations]. To receive company-specific rates, NME suppliers must 
demonstrate that: 
“(a) in the case of wholly or partly foreign owned firms or joint ventures, exporters are 
free to repatriate capital and profits; 
(b) export prices and quantities, and conditions and terms of sale are freely 
determined; 
(c) the majority of the shares belong to private persons; state officials appearing on the 
Published by Berkeley Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
130 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 34:2 
In EC-Fasteners, the WTO Appellate Body addressed the compatibility of 
the EU’s Individual Treatment test with relevant WTO provisions, particularly 
Article 6.10 of the WTO Antidumping Agreement. The Appellate Body 
examined the language of Article 6.10 and concluded that the use of the terms 
“shall” and “as a rule” in the first sentence of Article 6.10 expresses a 
mandatory obligation, not a mere preference, to determine company-specific 
dumping margins.118 This obligation, according to the Appellate Body, is 
subject only to the exception to use sampling as provided for in the second 
sentence of Article 6.10 and additional exceptions allowed in other WTO 
agreements.119 The Appellate Body found no provisions in relevant WTO 
agreements that would allow a WTO member to depart from the obligation to 
determine company-specific dumping margins only with respect to imports from 
NMEs.120 In particular, the Appellate Body rejected the EU’s efforts to justify 
its country-wide antidumping rate scheme under Article 15(d) of the China 
Accession Protocol. The Appellate Body concluded that while Article 15 of the 
China Accession Protocol establishes special rules regarding the use of surrogate 
values, “it does not contain an open-ended exception that allows WTO Members 
to treat China differently for other purposes under the Anti-Dumping Agreement 
and the GATT 1994, such as the determination of export prices or individual 
versus country-wide margins and duties.”121 The Appellate Body finally found 
that the EU’s Individual Treatment test, as provided for in Article 9(5) of the EU 
Basic Antidumping Regulations, is inconsistent with Article 6.10 of the WTO 
Antidumping Agreement because “it conditions the determination of individual 
dumping margins for and the imposition of individual anti-dumping duties on 
NME exporters or producers to the fulfilment of the [Individual Treatment] 
test.”122 
The Appellate Body’s ruling on country-wide antidumping rates in EC-
Fasteners rejected a long-standing practice that was essential to keeping 
 
board of directors or holding key management positions shall either be in minority or 
it must be demonstrated that the company is nonetheless sufficiently independent from 
State interference; 
(d) exchange rate conversions are carried out at the market rate; and 
(e) State interference is not such as to permit circumvention of measures if individual 
exporters are given different rates of duty.”  
Id. 
 117.  See, e.g., Chad P. Bown & Petros C. Mavroidis, One (Firm) is Not Enough: A Legal-
Economic Analysis of EC-Fasteners, 12 WORLD TRADE REV. 243, 244 (2013). 
 118.  Report of the Appellate Body, European Communities-Definitive Anti-Dumping 
Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China, WT/DS397/AB/R (Jul. 15, 2011), ¶¶ 315-
17 [hereinafter EC-Fasteners AB Report]. 
 119.  Id. ¶ 320. 
 120.  Id. ¶ 328. 
 121.  Id. ¶ 290. 
 122.  Id. ¶ 385. The Appellate Body also addressed the compatibility of Article 9(5) of the EU 
Basic Antidumping Regulations with other WTO provisions, such as Article 9.2 of the WTO 
Antidumping Agreement and Article I:1 of the GATT 1994. See id. ¶¶ 330-54, 386-98. 
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antidumping duties high for Chinese products.123 What prompted the Appellate 
Body to take this dramatic step appears to be the fact that the relevant WTO 
provisions on this issue are relatively clear. The way the provisions were drafted 
simply does not allow for the calculation of country-wide antidumping rates 
merely because the suppliers are from NME countries.124 To hold otherwise in 
the face of such textual clarity would strain the credibility of the rule-based 
world trade system. In the perpetual tug-of-war between free trade principles 
and protectionism, the former won an important battle.125 
B. Countervailing Duty Law 
Besides antidumping, another area of trade law that has seen constant 
tussles between free trade principles and protectionism in the face of China’s 
threats to the existing world trade order is countervailing duty law. Due to 
concerns about the systemic coherence of trade law, the United States had 
resisted the idea of applying countervailing duty law to Chinese products, until 
the level of protection offered by antidumping alone became inadequate to cope 
with surging imports from China. The application of countervailing duty law to 
Chinese products raises a host of thorny issues, including the potential double-
counting of subsidies, the determination of whether a firm is a “public body” 
capable of conferring subsidies, and the use of cross-border benchmarks in 
measuring the magnitudes of subsidies. As discussed below, the WTO’s 
handling of these issues further disturbed the already delicate balance struck by 
trade law with respect to China. 
1.  To Countervail or to Not Countervail? 
As a threshold matter, the basic WTO rules governing countervailing 
duties—Article VI of the GATT and the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement)—place no limitations on the reach 
of countervailing duty law. However, the USDOC, the U.S. agency responsible 
for assessing antidumping and countervailing duties, initially chose not to apply 
countervailing duty law to imports from NMEs. In 1984, the USDOC laid out its 
 
 123.  For the importance of country-wide antidumping rates to antidumping authorities, see 
supra notes 111-113 and accompanying text. 
 124.  It is not clear why the use of country-wide antidumping rates for Chinese companies, 
which predated China’s entry into the WTO, was not explicitly recognized and sanctioned in the 
China Accession Protocol. As the Appellate Body in EC-Fasteners observed, Paragraph 15 of the 
China Accession Protocol only concerns the use of surrogate values, not the use of country-wide 
antidumping rates, for Chinese companies. The failure to explicitly provide for a central 
antidumping tool in China’s Accession Protocol is likely an oversight on the part of Western trade 
negotiators and treaty drafters. 
 125.  In June 2012, the European Union implemented the Appellate Body’s findings in DS397 
with respect to country-wide antidumping rates by eliminating the presumption of non-independence 
from the state for producers from NME countries.  See Regulation (EU) No. 765/2012 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of  13 June 2012, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32012R0765.  
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position on countervailing duties for NME countries in Carbon Steel Wire Rod 
from Poland.126 The USDOC asserted that subsidies, which it defined as “any 
action that distorts or subverts the market process and results in a misallocation 
of resources,”127 were a meaningless concept in NME countries because those 
countries had no market processes to be distorted or subverted to begin with.128 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit upheld this determination in 
the landmark case of Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States in 1986.129 After 
examining the purpose of countervailing duty law, the nature of nonmarket 
economies, and the action Congress had taken in other statutes that specifically 
addressed the question of imports from NMEs, the Federal Circuit concluded 
that the economic incentives and benefits provided by the NMEs in question for 
exports to the United States did not constitute subsidies within the meaning of 
U.S. countervailing duty law. 130 
As discussed in Part II.A.1 above, in the early 1990s, the USDOC briefly 
recognized some Chinese domestic prices as market-driven and therefore used 
them for price comparisons in antidumping proceedings. The USDOC was then 
confronted with the question of whether the same market forces it recognized as 
being present in China should lead to the conclusion that countervailing duty 
law should be applied to China.131 The USDOC eventually said no to this 
question, and opted to reverse its uses of actual Chinese prices in antidumping 
for the sake of trade law’s internal coherence.132 
Arguably, the USDOC was able to withstand pressure to impose 
countervailing duties on Chinese products on top of antidumping duties in the 
1980s and early 1990s because such pressure was not severe enough at the time. 
Fast forwarding twenty-five years, when U.S. petitioners tried again to impose 
countervailing duties on Chinese products, the USDOC changed course. In a 
2007 policy memorandum, the USDOC examined whether the analytical 
elements of the Federal Circuit’s Georgetown Steel decision were still applicable 
to China’s present-day economy.133 The USDOC stated that China’s economy at 
the time was “significantly different” from the Soviet-style economies at issue in 
Georgetown Steel.134 China’s economy was more flexible, said the USDOC, 
 
 126.  Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Poland, 49 Fed. Reg. 19,374 (Dep’t of Comm. May 7, 1984) 
(final negative countervailing duty determination). 
 127.  Id. at 19, 375. 
 128.  Id.  
 129.  See Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
 130.  Id. at 1313-18. 
 131.  See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 132.  See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
 133.  See Memorandum from Shauna Lee-Alaia & Lawrence Norton, Office of Policy, Import 
Admin., to David M. Spooner, Asst. Sec’y, Import Admin., Countervailing Duty Investigation of 
Coated Free Sheet Paper from the People’s Republic of China–Whether the Analytical Elements of 
the Georgetown Steel Opinion are Applicable to China’s Present-Day Economy (Mar. 29, 2007) 
[hereinafter Georgetown Steel Memo]. 
 134.  Id. at 4. 
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than the Soviet-style economies in terms of the power to set wages and prices, 
access to foreign currency, personal property rights and private 
entrepreneurship, foreign trading rights, and allocation of financial resources.135 
As a result, the USDOC concluded that “it is possible to determine whether the 
PRC Government has bestowed a benefit upon a Chinese producer (i.e., the 
subsidy can be identified and measured) and whether any such benefit is 
specific.” 136 
It could be argued that the USDOC’s decision to apply countervailing duty 
law to China was based on principles, not on expediency. After all, it is 
undeniable that China’s economy in 2007 had undergone dramatic 
transformations since the 1980s. The policy of not applying countervailing duty 
law to NMEs—a policy rooted in the conceptualization of NMEs as Soviet-style 
economies—arguably no longer reflected China’s economic reality. 
What made the USDOC’s move problematic, however, is that while the 
USDOC recognized market forces in China for countervailing duty purposes, it 
continually refused to recognize market forces in China for antidumping 
purposes. In 2006, in its latest assessment of whether China should continue to 
be designated as an NME, the USDOC determined that “market forces in China 
are not yet sufficiently developed to permit the use of prices and costs in that 
country for purposes of the Department’s dumping analysis.”137 A year later, in 
its Georgetown Steel memorandum, which concluded that countervailing duty 
law now applied to China, the USDOC acknowledged that “[t]he features and 
characteristics of China’s present-day economy also suggest that modification of 
some aspects of the Department’s current NME antidumping policy and practice 
may be warranted, such as the conditions under which the Department might 
grant an NME respondent market economy treatment.”138 In 2007, the USDOC 
issued requests for public comments on how it might be able to grant market-
economy treatment to individual Chinese respondents in antidumping 
proceedings.139 These requests for comments, however, have not resulted in any 
concrete action on the part of the USDOC. As such, the USDOC’s policy 
towards China is caught in an obvious contradiction: Market forces in China are 
considered strong enough for subsidies to be identified and measured, but not 
strong enough for Chinese domestic prices or costs to be used as the basis of 
 
 135.  Id. at 5-9. 
 136.  Id. at 10. After determining that the Chinese government had granted a subsidy, the 
USDOC could then potentially apply countervailing duty law to Chinese imports. 
 137.  Shauna Lee-Alaia et al., Imp. Admin., Antidumping Duty Investigation of Certain Lined 
Paper Products from the People’s Republic of China (China)—China’s Status as a Non-Market 
Economy (NME) 4 (2006), http://enforcement.trade.gov/download/prc-nme-status/prc-lined-paper-
memo-08302006.pdf. 
 138.  Georgetown Steel Memo, supra note 133, at 11. 
 139.  Antidumping Methodologies in Proceedings Involving Certain Non-Market Economies: 
Market-Oriented Enterprise, 72 Fed. Reg. 29,302 (Dep’t of Comm. May 25, 2007) (request for 
comment); Antidumping Methodologies in Proceedings Involving Certain Non-Market Economies: 
Market-Oriented Enterprise: Request for Comment, 72 Fed. Reg. 60,649 (Dep’t of Comm. Oct. 25, 
2007).  
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comparison in antidumping. While one could explain away this contradiction by 
pointing to the hybrid nature of China’s economy today, a more plausible 
interpretation appears to be that the USDOC’s new policy serves the needs to 
maintain maximum levels of protection against Chinese products. 
2. Double Counting 
After the USDOC started applying countervailing duty law to imports from 
China, Chinese respondents filed legal actions in both U.S. domestic courts and 
international venues to challenge the simultaneous imposition of countervailing 
and antidumping duties calculated using the surrogate-value methodology.  One 
central issue raised in these legal actions was whether the amount of 
antidumping duties calculated using the surrogate-value methodology already 
captures subsidies that may have been conferred on the subject merchandise. If 
so, then the subsidies would have been double-counted, once through the 
countervailing duties and once through the antidumping duties. As discussed in 
detail below, litigation over the double-counting issue forced the USDOC to roll 
back some, but not all, of the countervailing duties imposed on Chinese 
products. 
Initially, Chinese respondents attempted to have U.S. courts strip the 
USDOC of its authority to apply countervailing duty law to imports from China 
altogether. In GPX International Tire Corp. v. United States (“GPX I”), decided 
in September 2009, Chinese respondents argued that the U.S. countervailing 
duty statute barred the application of countervailing duty law to imports from 
NMEs.140 The U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT) disagreed. Citing the 
ambiguity in both the Federal Circuit’s Georgetown Steel ruling and the 
countervailing duty law itself regarding the applicability of the countervailing 
duty law to NMEs, the CIT stated that it “cannot say from the statutory language 
alone that Commerce does not have the authority to impose [countervailing 
duties] on products from an NME-designated country.”141 
While Chinese respondents’ argument that the USDOC lacked statutory 
authority to apply countervailing duty law to NME imports floundered, their 
alternative argument regarding double-counting gained traction in U.S. courts. 
In GPX I, the Chinese plaintiff argued that “double counting occurs when 
Commerce imposes a CVD remedy to offset an alleged government subsidy, but 
then compares a subsidy-free constructed normal value (essentially using 
information from surrogate countries) with the original subsidized export price 
to calculate the AD margin.”142 Imposing countervailing duties on top of the 
antidumping duties, according to the plaintiff, will therefore result in the double 
counting and double remedy of the subsidies.143 The CIT in GPX I turned out to 
 
 140.  645 F.Supp.2d 1231, 1236-40 (Ct Int’l Trade 2009) (discussing whether the USDOC has 
the statutory authority to apply countervailing duty law to imports from NMEs) [hereinafter GPX I]. 
 141.  Id. at 1239. 
 142.  Id. at 1241. 
 143.  Id. For detailed illustrations of why double counting might occur in simultaneous 
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be highly receptive to this analysis. The CIT stated that under the surrogate-
value method, “the export price is not being compared with the price of the good 
in the PRC in which case both sides of the comparison would be equally 
affected, but rather, export price, however it is affected by the subsidy, is 
compared with the presumptively subsidy-free constructed normal value.”144 
Without some type of adjustment, therefore, the simultaneous imposition of 
antidumping duties and countervailing duties in this situation “could very well 
result in a double remedy.”145 The CIT went on to hold that “if . . . it is too 
difficult for Commerce to determine whether, and to what degree double 
counting is occurring, Commerce should refrain from imposing CVDs on NME 
goods until it is prepared to address this problem through improved 
methodologies or new statutory tools.”146 The CIT remanded the case back to 
the USDOC, requiring the USDOC to either forego the imposition of 
countervailing duties on the Chinese products at issue or to adopt additional 
policies and procedures to address the double-counting issue.147 
In its remand determination issued in response to the CIT ruling in GPX I, 
the USDOC explored ways to avoid the double remedy of subsidies for Chinese 
products.148 The USDOC concluded that it had three options: It could choose 
not to apply countervailing duty law to Chinese products, choose to apply the 
market economy antidumping methodology to Chinese products, or apply both 
countervailing duty law and the NME antidumping methodology to Chinese 
products but use the countervailing duties to offset the antidumping duties. 149 
The DOC adopted the third option because it believed that it was “the least 
objectionable of the three.”150 
Upon appeal of the USDOC’s remand determination, in August 2010, the 
CIT once again rejected the USDOC’s handling of the double-counting issue. In 
GPX International Corp. v. United States (GPX II), the CIT observed that under 
the offset proposed by the USDOC, the combined antidumping and 
countervailing duties will always equal the unaltered antidumping duties.151 
This, according to the CIT, “renders concurrent CVD and AD investigations 
unnecessary because the same remedial price adjustment can otherwise be 
 
antidumping and countervailing duty cases involving NME products, see Wentong Zheng, Counting 
Once, Counting Twice: The Precarious State of Subsidy Regulation, 49 STAN. J. INT’L L. 427, 439-
40 (2013).  
 144.  GPX I, supra note 140, at 1242. 
 145.  Id.  
 146.  Id. at 1243.  
 147.  Id. at 1251.  
 148.  Dep’t of Commerce, Final Results of Redetermination Pursuant to Remand (2010), 
http://ia.ita.doc.gov/remands/09-103.pdf. 
 149.  Id. at 8. 
 150.  Id. For discussions of why the USDOC found the first two options to be more 
objectionable, see id. at 8-9. 
 151.  GPX Int’l Corp. v. United States, 715 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1345 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2010) 
[hereinafter GPX II]. 
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obtained by merely conducting an NME AD investigation.”152 The CIT agreed 
with the Chinese plaintiffs that “it is not reasonable to ‘force[] foreign parties to 
spend many months and large sums of money to go through an investigation, the 
end result of which is to calculate a CVD margin, but then to eliminate that 
CVD [margin] because it has been offset by some parallel investigation.’”153 
The CIT further held that the proposed offset had no legal basis in U.S. 
antidumping law anyway.154 Given the USDOC’s inability to determine whether 
and to what degree double counting was occurring, the CIT held that the only 
option left for the USDOC was not to apply the countervailing duty law to 
imports from China.155 
In December 2011, in GPX International Corp. v. United States (GPX III), 
the Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s GPX II ruling, but on a different 
ground.156 The Federal Circuit was far more skeptical than the CIT about the 
entire double-counting argument. It expressed doubts about whether U.S. law 
prohibited double-counting, and gave credence to the fact that the USDOC had 
determined that it was not clear whether double counting had in fact occurred.157 
But the Federal Circuit still held that U.S. countervailing duty law barred the 
imposition of countervailing duties on imports from NMEs because of the 
principle of legislative ratification. Since Congress amended U.S. trade law 
many times after the Georgetown Steel decision, but did not make any changes 
that would have altered the USDOC’s handling of countervailing duty law for 
NME imports, the Federal Circuit concluded that Congress ratified the 
USDOC’s then-prevailing policy of not applying countervailing duty law to 
NME imports. 158 If the USDOC believed that countervailing duty law should 
apply to NME imports, said the Federal Circuit, then “the appropriate approach 
would be to seek legislative change.”159 
While the GPX litigation was pending in U.S. courts, the Chinese 
government filed claims before the WTO against the USDOC’s simultaneous 
application of NME antidumping and countervailing duties to Chinese products. 
In October 2010 a WTO dispute settlement panel issued DS379, its final report 
 
 152.  Id. 
 153.  Id. The CIT did not explain why the respondents could not simply ignore the 
countervailing duty proceedings. Arguably, this is because the combined antidumping and 
countervailing duty rate will equal the unaltered antidumping rate only if the countervailing duty rate 
is less than the unaltered antidumping rate. If the countervailing duty rate is greater than the 
unaltered antidumping rate, the combined antidumping and countervailing duty rate will equal the 
countervailing duty rate. The respondents could not ignore the countervailing duty proceedings, 
because there is a possibility that the combined rate will be determined by the countervailing duty 
rate. 
 154.   Id. 
 155.  Id. at 1346.  
 156.  GPX Int’l Tire Corp. v. United States, 666 F.3d 732 (Fed. Cir. 2011) [hereinafter GPX 
III]. 
 157.  See id. at 737. 
 158.  Id. at 739-45. 
 159.  Id. at 745. 
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in which China pressed its double-counting claims.160 The panel acknowledged 
the theoretical possibility of double counting, noting that the use of the NME 
antidumping methodology leads to “an asymmetric dumping margin comparison 
between an unsubsidized normal value and subsidized export price.”161 This, in 
turn, led the panel to believe that “at least some double remedy will likely arise 
from the concurrent imposition of countervailing duties and antidumping duties 
calculated under an NME methodology.”162 That said, however, the panel went 
on to hold that even if double counting did occur, it was not inconsistent with 
any of the WTO provisions cited by China and therefore raised no issues under 
WTO law.163 
Upon appeal of the WTO panel’s ruling in DS379, China found a more 
friendly audience for its double-counting claims at the WTO Appellate Body. In 
its final report issued in March 2011, the Appellate Body reversed the panel’s 
findings as to whether WTO law prohibited double counting.164 Specifically, the 
Appellate Body held that the panel erred in its interpretation of Article 19.3 of 
the SCM Agreement,165 which requires a countervailing duty to be imposed in 
the “appropriate” amounts.166 The Appellate Body stated that “the amount of a 
countervailing duty cannot be ‘appropriate’ in situations where that duty 
represents the full amount of the subsidy and where antidumping duties, 
calculated at least to some extent on the basis of the same subsidization, are 
imposed concurrently to remove the same injury to the domestic industry.”167 
The Appellate Body then recognized that the occurrence of double counting 
depended on “whether and to what extent domestic subsidies have lowered the 
export price of a product, and on whether the investigating authority has taken 
the necessary corrective steps to adjust its methodology to take account of this 
factual situation.”168 In the USDOC proceedings at issue, however, the USDOC 
“did not initiate any examination of whether double remedies would arise . . . 
 
 160.  See Report of the Panel, United States-Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing 
Duties on Certain Products from China, WT/DS379/R (Oct. 22, 2010) [hereinafter DS379 Panel 
Report]. 
 161.  Id. ¶ 14.72 (emphasis original). 
 162.  Id. ¶ 14.75 (emphasis original). 
 163.  Id. ¶ 14.76. China argued that double counting was inconsistent with Articles 10, 19.3, 
19.4 and 32.1 of the SCM Agreement and Articles VI:3 and I:1 of the GATT 1994. The panel 
rejected all of these arguments. See id. at 14.104-.140, .144-.149, .164-.182.  
 164.  See Report of the Appellate Body, United States-Definitive Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R (Mar. 11, 2011), ¶¶ 545-
91 [hereinafter DS379 AB Report]. 
 165.  Id. ¶ 582. 
 166.  WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14, art. 19.3 
[hereinafter SCM Agreement] (“When a countervailing duty is imposed in respect of any product, 
such countervailing duty shall be levied, in the appropriate amounts in each case, on a non-
discriminatory basis on imports of such product from all sources found to be subsidized and causing 
injury . . . .”). 
 167.  DS379 AB Report, supra note 164, ¶ 582. 
 168.  Id. ¶ 599. 
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and refused outright to afford any consideration to the issue or to the 
submissions pertaining to the issue that were presented to it.”169 The Appellate 
Body found this failure to conduct any factual inquiries as to the double-
counting issue to be inconsistent with the requirement of Article 19.3 of the 
SCM Agreement.170 
Confronted with two adverse rulings on the application of U.S. 
countervailing duty law to imports from NMEs, one by the Federal Circuit and 
one by the WTO Appellate Body, the United States Congress took up the task of 
amending U.S. countervailing duty law by enacting Public Law 112-99 (P.L. 
112-99) in March 2012.171 In P.L. 112-99, Congress overrode the Federal 
Circuit’s ruling in GPX III and explicitly provided that U.S. countervailing duty 
law applied to imports from NMEs.172 To comply with the Appellate Body’s 
ruling in DS379, P.L. 112-99 added a new provision to U.S. countervailing duty 
law requiring the USDOC to reduce the antidumping duty amount by the 
amount of countervailable subsidies that are demonstrated to have been double-
counted.173 
In July 2012, pursuant to the new statutory requirements set forth in P.L. 
112-99, the USDOC issued its amended determinations for the antidumping and 
countervailing duty proceedings challenged in DS379.174 In the amended 
determinations, the USDOC allocated to the Chinese respondents the burden of 
demonstrating their entitlement to adjustments to their antidumping duty 
rates.175 The USDOC considered the Chinese respondents to have met this 
burden with respect to certain input subsidies, namely, subsidies on inputs used 
in the manufacturing of the subject merchandise.176 The USDOC calculated the 
amount of the input subsidies that had been double-counted as being sixty-three 
 
 169.  Id. ¶ 604. 
 170.  Id. ¶ 606. 
 171.  See Act of Mar. 13, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-99, 126 Stat. 265 [hereinafter P.L. 112-99]. 
 172.  Id. section 1(a) (“[T]he merchandise on which countervailing duties shall be imposed 
under [section 701(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930] includes a class or kind of merchandise imported, or 
sold (or likely to be sold) for importation, into the United States from a nonmarket economy 
country.”). 
 173.  Id. section 2(a). The new provision requires the USDOC to adjust the antidumping duty 
amount only if the countervailing duty “has been demonstrated to have reduced the average price of 
imports of the class or kind of merchandise,” and the USDOC can “reasonably estimate” the extent 
to which the countervailing duty has increased the antidumping duty. 
 174.  See Circular Welded Carbon Quality Steel Pipe from the People’s Republic of China 
(Dep’t of Commerce July 31, 2012) (final section 129 determination) [hereinafter CWP Section 129 
Determination], http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/section129/prc-cwcq-steel-pipe-Final-129-
Determination-20120830.pdf; Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires from the People’s 
Republic of China (Dep’t of Commerce July 31, 2012) (final section 129 determination), 
http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/section129/prc-otr-tires-Final-129-Determination-20120830.pdf; 
Laminated Woven Sacks from the People’s Republic of China (Dep’t of Commerce July 31, 2012) 
(final section 129 determination), http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/section129/prc-lw-sacks-Final-129-
Determination-20120830.pdf.  
 175.  See, e.g., CWP Section 129 Determination, supra note 174, at 14. 
 176.  Id. at 14-15.  
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percent of the subsidies.177 As a result, the USDOC subtracted sixty-three 
percent of the input subsidies from the amount of the antidumping duties.178 
In sum, through its legal maneuvers on the double-counting issue, China 
succeeded in forcing the United States to scale back some of the countervailing 
duties it had newly imposed on Chinese products. In the face of highly complex 
economic issues surrounding the double-counting issue,179 the WTO Appellate 
Body took a cautious approach and required member countries to at least take 
cognizance of the double-counting issue. The WTO’s willingness to reject a 
trade practice on the basis of the mere possibility of unfairness manifests its 
preference to err on the side of overreaction for the sake of sound principles. But 
at the same time, the United States was able to impose at least some 
countervailing duties on top of antidumping duties for Chinese products, with 
the end result being a higher level of protection against Chinese products. 
3. Public Body 
Aside from the threshold questions of whether countervailing duty law 
applies to Chinese products and whether they have been double-counted, 
countervailing duty investigating authorities from around the world also have to 
grapple with questions that are of a technical nature but have a big impact on the 
way countervailing duties are assessed for Chinese products. One such technical 
question is whether Chinese state-owned enterprises and banks should be 
considered “public bodies” and therefore capable of conferring subsidies within 
the meaning of the SCM Agreement. As discussed below, the hybrid nature of 
the Chinese economy created an opening for importing countries to interpret the 
term “public body” in ways that made it easier to prove the existence of a 
countervailable subsidy. The WTO, however, rejected some of those 
interpretations and required more evidence than mere government ownership in 
determining whether a Chinese entity is a public body. 
Under the SCM Agreement, only a government or public body is capable 
of directly giving subsidies.180 If a private body is accused of giving a subsidy, it 
must be demonstrated that a government “entrusts or directs” the private body to 
carry out a function that “would normally be vested in the government” and the 
practice followed by the private body “in no real sense . . . differs from practices 
normally followed by governments.”181 
 
 177.  Id. at 19. In arriving at this number, the USDOC compared the ratio of change between 
input prices as proxied by an aggregate-level China purchasing price index and output prices as 
proxied by an aggregate-level China production price index. See id. at 18-19. 
 178.  Id. at 35-36.  
 179.  For discussions of the economics behind the double-counting issue, see Wentong Zheng, 
Counting Once, Counting Twice: The Precarious State of Subsidy Regulation, 49 STAN. J. INT’L L. 
427, 450-58 (2013). 
 180.  SCM Agreement, supra note 166, art. 1.1(a)(1) (“[A] subsidy shall be deemed to exist 
if . . . there is a financial contribution by a government or any public body within the territory of a 
Member . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 181.  Id. .1(a)(1)(iv). 
Published by Berkeley Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
140 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 34:2 
The interpretation of the term “public body,” which the SCM Agreement 
does not define, proved to be a particularly thorny issue in U.S. countervailing 
duty proceedings involving Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) or state-
owned commercial banks (SOCBs). Some of the subsidies alleged in those 
proceedings were input subsidies given by Chinese SOEs that sold products to 
downstream producers of the subject merchandise at below-market prices and 
loan subsidies given by Chinese SOCBs that made loans to producers of the 
subject merchandise at below-market interest rates.182 If the SOE input suppliers 
and SOCB lenders were considered public bodies, then the USDOC would be 
able to bypass the requirement to show “entrustment or direction” for those 
entities, making it much easier to prove the existence of a countervailable 
subsidy.183 
The USDOC moved precisely in this direction by treating Chinese SOEs 
and SOCBs as public bodies. In Light-Walled Rectangular Pipe and Tube from 
People’s Republic of China in 2008, for example, the USDOC investigated 
certain Chinese steel producers for allegedly providing input subsidies to 
downstream steel pipe and tube producers by selling steel products to them for 
less than adequate remuneration.184 In determining whether those input suppliers 
were public bodies, the USDOC refused to apply a five-factor test that it had 
used in prior cases involving non-Chinese producers, on the grounds that the 
Chinese government failed to provide sufficient information on factors other 
 
 182.  See, e.g., Memorandum from Stephen J. Claeys, Assistant Sec’y for Import Admin., to 
David M. Spooner, Deputy Assistant Sec’y for Import Admin., Issues and Decision Memorandum 
for the Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road 
Tires (OTR Tires) from the People’s Republic of China 9-15 (Jul. 7, 2008), 
http://enforcement.trade.gov/frn/summary/PRC/E8-16154-1.pdf [hereinafter OTR Tires CVD I&D 
Memo]; Memorandum from Stephen J. Claeys, Assistant Sec’y for Import Admin., to David M. 
Spooner, Deputy Assistant Sec’y for Import Admin., Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final 
Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Laminated Woven Sacks from the People’s 
Republic of China 18-26 (Jun. 16, 2008), http://enforcement.trade.gov/frn/summary/PRC/E8-14256-
1.pdf [hereinafter LWS CVD I&D Memo]; Memorandum from Stephen J. Claeys, Assistant Sec’y 
for Import Admin., to David M. Spooner, Deputy Assistant Sec’y for Import Admin., Issues and 
Decision Memorandum for the Final Determination in the Countervailing Duty Investigation of 
Light-Walled Rectangular Pipe and Tube from the People’s Republic of China 8-9 (Jun. 13, 2008), 
http://enforcement.trade.gov/frn/summary/PRC/E8-14250-1.pdf [hereinafter LWP CVD I&D 
Memo]; Memorandum from Stephen J. Claeys, Assistant Sec’y for Import Admin., to David M. 
Spooner, Deputy Assistant Sec’y for Import Admin., Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final 
Determination in the Countervailing Duty Investigation of Circular-Welded Carbon Quality Steel 
Pipe from the People’s Republic of China 9-12, 14-15 (May 29, 2008), 
http://enforcement.trade.gov/frn/summary/PRC/E8-12606-1.pdf [hereinafter CWP CVD I&D 
Memo].  
 183.  Proving “entrustment or direction” is no easy matter. In US— Countervailing Duty 
Investigation on DRAMs, the WTO Appellate Body held that to show “entrustment or direction,” 
there must be a “demonstrable link between the government and the conduct of the private body.” 
Report of the Appellate Body, United States-Countervailing Duty Investigation on Dynamic 
Random Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMs) from Korea, WT/DS296/AB/R (Jun. 27, 2005), 
¶ 112. It further held that “mere policy pronouncements” are insufficient, and that “entrustment and 
direction” imply “a more active role than mere acts of encouragement” and cannot be “inadvertent or 
a mere by-product of government regulation.” Id. ¶ 114. 
 184.  See LWP CVD I&D Memo, supra note 182, at 8-9.  
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than the government ownership of the input suppliers185 Instead, for those input 
suppliers, the USDOC adopted a “majority ownership” rule, under which any 
input suppliers that were majority owned by the Chinese government were 
considered public bodies186 In another case, Coated Free Sheet Paper from the 
People’s Republic of China in 2007, the USDOC similarly treated Chinese 
SOCBs as public bodies on the grounds that the Chinese government maintained 
near complete state ownership of the banking sector in China and exercised 
extensive control and influences over the operations of SOCBs.187 
China challenged the USDOC’s public body determinations before the 
WTO. In DS379, the WTO dispute settlement panel sided with the USDOC with 
respect to its determinations for both the SOEs and the SOCBs. As for the SOEs, 
the panel interpreted the term “public body” in Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM 
Agreement as “any entity controlled by a government.188 Government 
ownership, according to the Panel, was “highly relevant (indeed potentially 
dispositive) evidence of government control.”189 The panel therefore found “no 
legal error . . . in giving primacy to evidence of majority government-
ownership.”190 For the same reasons, the panel also upheld the USDOC’s 
determination that the Chinese SOCBs in question were public bodies.191 
On appeal of the panel’s report in DS379, the WTO Appellate Body 
reversed the panel’s finding as to the SOEs but upheld its finding as to the 
SOCBs. The Appellate Body first disagreed with the panel’s equation of public 
body with government control, stating that “control of an entity by a 
government, in itself, is not sufficient to establish that an entity is a public 
body.”192 The Appellate Body went on to hold that the assessment of whether an 
entity is a public body “must focus on evidence relevant to the question of 
whether the entity is vested with or exercises government authority.”193 
According to the Appellate Body, the USDOC’s reliance on government 
ownership in its public body determinations was not sufficient “because 
evidence of government ownership, in itself, is not evidence of meaningful 
control of an entity by government and cannot, without more, serve as a basis 
 
 185.  Id. at 28-30. The five-factor test the USDOC used in prior cases inquires about the 
government ownership of an entity, the government’s presence on the entity’s board of directors, the 
government’s control over the entity’s activities, the entity’s pursuit of governmental policies or 
interests, and whether the entity is created by statute. Id. at 26-27. 
 186.  Id. at 29.  
 187.  See Memorandum from Stephen J. Claeys, Assistant Sec’y for Import Admin., to David 
M. Spooner, Deputy Assistant Sec’y for Import Admin., on the Issues and Decision Memorandum 
for the Final Determination in the Countervailing Duty Investigation of Coated Free Sheet Paper 
from the People’s Republic of China 55-61 (Oct. 17, 2007), 
http://enforcement.trade.gov/frn/summary/PRC/E7-21046-1.pdf [hereinafter CFP CVD I&D Memo].  
 188.  DS379 Panel Report, supra note 160, ¶ 8.94. 
 189.  Id. ¶ 8.134. 
 190.  Id. ¶ 8.136. 
 191.  Id. ¶¶ 8.142-.143. 
 192.  DS379 AB Report, supra note 164, ¶ 320. 
 193.  Id. ¶ 345. 
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for establishing that the entity is vested with authority to perform a 
governmental function.”194 As for the SOCBs, the Appellate Body noted that the 
USDOC considered “extensive evidence relating to the relationship between the 
SOCBs and the Chinese Government, including evidence that the SOCBs are 
meaningfully controlled by the government in the exercise of their functions.”195 
The Appellate Body concluded that “these considerations, taken together, 
demonstrate that the USDOC’s public body determination in respect of SOCBs 
was supported by evidence on the record that these SOCBs exercise 
governmental functions on behalf of the Chinese Government.”196 
In a subsequent WTO dispute settlement proceeding, DS437, a WTO 
dispute settlement panel further clarified the meaning of “public body” in 
Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement.197 The panel in DS437 understood the 
Appellate Body in DS379 “to have found that the critical consideration in 
identifying a public body is the question of authority to perform governmental 
functions.”198 The panel was not persuaded, however, by China’s argument that 
“[a] public body, like government in the narrow sense, thus must itself possess 
the authority to ‘regulate, control, supervise or restrain’ the conduct of others.” 
199 That interpretation, according to the panel, would equate the term “public 
body” with the term “government agency,” an approach that the Appellate Body 
in DS379 did not follow.200 But at the same time, the panel also rejected a 
definition of the term “public body” based on “simple ownership or control by a 
government.”201 The panel thus concluded that the USDOC acted inconsistently 
with Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement when it found that Chinese SOEs 
were public bodies “based solely on the grounds that these enterprises were 
(majority) owned, or otherwise controlled, by the Government of China.”202 
In sum, through its interpretations of the term “public body,” the WTO 
stayed away from automatically treating all Chinese SOEs as part of the Chinese 
government itself. The WTO took a more nuanced approach that requires 
inquiries into whether the SOEs exercise governmental functions. While this 
approach poses hurdles to finding a countervailable subsidy from the business 
operations of Chinese SOEs, it preserves WTO member countries’ ability to 
 
 194.  Id. ¶ 346. 
 195.  Id. ¶ 355. 
 196.  Id. 
 197.  See Report of the Panel, United States—Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain 
Products from China, ¶ 7.65-.75, WT/DS437/R (July 14, 2014) [hereinafter DS437 Panel Report]. 
 198.  Id. ¶ 7.66. 
 199.  Id. ¶ 7.67. 
 200.  Id. ¶ 7.68. 
 201.  Id. ¶ 7.68-.72. 
 202.  DS437 Panel Report, supra note 197, ¶ 7.75.The panel, however, did not address the 
United States’ argument that the term “public body” should be interpreted to mean “an entity that is 
controlled by a government such that the government can use the resources of that entity as its own.” 
See Id. ¶ 7.74. The panel considered it unnecessary to evaluate that argument because it was not the 
basis of the USDOC’s public body determinations in the underlying proceedings. Id.  
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impose countervailing duties if the Chinese SOEs are indeed engaged in 
activities of governmental nature. 
4. Out-of-Country Benchmarks 
Another issue that has had a tremendous impact on the assessment of 
countervailing duties for Chinese products is the use of out-of-country or cross-
border benchmarks in measuring the magnitudes of subsidies. As discussed 
below, the extensive role of the Chinese government in China’s economy 
created an opportunity for investigating authorities to discard Chinese domestic 
prices and opt for third-country prices as the benchmark in calculating the 
amounts of countervailing duties. Like the use of surrogate values in 
antidumping, the use of out-of-country benchmarks in countervailing duty 
proceedings tends to inflate the amounts of countervailing duties and result in a 
higher level of protection against Chinese products. But as detailed below, 
China was able to persuade the WTO to reject the use of out-of-country 
benchmarks in some of the most egregious situations, dealing a setback to 
investigating authorities and petitioners seeking to take advantage of the WTO’s 
tolerance of such benchmarks. 
Under the SCM Agreement, a countervailable subsidy exists only if the 
alleged subsidy confers a “benefit” on the recipient of the subsidy.203 The SCM 
Agreement, however, does not offer a definition of the term “benefit.” It only 
provides guidelines on how to calculate the benefit of a subsidy to the recipient 
in four scenarios involving the government provision of equity capital, loans, 
and loan guarantees, and the provision of goods or services or the purchase of 
goods by a government.204 In Canada—Measures Affecting the Export of 
Civilian Aircraft, the WTO Appellate Body made clear that the common theme 
of those guidelines is to identify a subsidy by determining “whether the recipient 
has received a ‘financial contribution’ on terms more favourable than those 
available to the recipient in the market.”205 In United States-Final 
Countervailing Duty Determination With Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber 
from Canada, the Appellate Body held that under Article 14(d) of the SCM 
Agreement, which concerns the government provision of goods or services for 
less than adequate remuneration, an investigating authority “may use a 
benchmark other than private prices in the country of provision . . . if it is first 
established that private prices in that country are distorted because of the 
government’s predominant role in providing those goods.”206 This opened the 
 
 203.  SCM Agreement, supra note 166, art. 1.1(b).  
 204.  Id. art. 14. 
 205.  Report of the Appellate Body, Canada—Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian 
Aircraft, ¶ 157, WT/DS70/AB/R (Aug. 2, 1999). 
 206.  Report of the Appellate Body, United States-Final Countervailing Duty Determination 
With Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, ¶ 90, WT/DS257/AB/R (Jan. 19, 2004). 
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door to the use of out-of-country prices as the benchmark for measuring the 
benefit of a subsidy.207 
After the USDOC started applying countervailing duties to Chinese 
products in 2007, the USDOC moved swiftly to use out-of-country benchmarks 
to measure the magnitudes of several types of alleged Chinese subsidies: loan, 
input, and land use subsidies. In Coated Free Sheet Paper from the People’s 
Republic of China in 2007, the USDOC investigated whether the Chinese 
producers of the subject merchandise received loans from Chinese policy banks 
and state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) at below-market interest rates.208 
In evaluating whether the loans were at below-market rates and, if so, by how 
much, the USDOC refused to use the interest rates for loans made by private and 
foreign banks in China as the benchmark for market interest rates. This was 
because “[the Chinese government]’s intervention in the banking sector creates 
significant distortions, even restricting and influencing private and foreign banks 
within the PRC.”209 The USDOC also rejected Chinese national interest rates as 
the benchmark by pointing to the “pervasiveness of the [Chinese government]’s 
intervention in the banking sector.”210 Having rejected these in-country 
benchmarks, the USDOC constructed an out-of-country loan benchmark based 
on the interest rates of thirty-three lower- to middle-income countries considered 
comparable to China’s economic development level.211 After Coated Free 
Paper from the People’s Republic of China, the USDOC routinely used the 
same kind of out-of-country loan benchmarks in subsequent countervailing duty 
proceedings involving Chinese products.212 
The USDOC also used out-of-country benchmarks to measure whether 
Chinese SOEs sold inputs to downstream producers at below-market prices. In 
Circular Welded Carbon Quality Steel Pipe from the People’s Republic of 
China, for example, the USDOC found that 96.1% of the input in question, hot-
rolled steel, was provided by SOEs.213 The USDOC thus rejected Chinese 
domestic prices for hot-rolled steel as the market price benchmark because 
“where the Department finds that the government provides the majority, or a 
 
 207.  For detailed discussions of the history of out-of-country benchmarks in countervailing 
duty law, see Wentong Zheng, The Pitfalls of the (Perfect) Market Benchmark: The Case of 
Countervailing Duty Law, 19 MINN. J. INT’L L. 1, 8-35 (2010).  
 208.  See Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Determination in the Countervailing 
Duty Investigation of Coated Free Sheet Paper from the People’s Republic of China (Oct. 17, 2007), 
at 5, http://enforcement.trade.gov/frn/summary/PRC/E7-21046-1.pdf [hereinafter China CFS Paper 
I&D Memo]. 
 209.  Id. at 5. 
 210.  Id. at 6. 
 211.  Id. In constructing the out-of-country loan benchmark, the USDOC did not use the simple 
average of the interest rates of the comparable countries, but regressed the interest rates of the 
comparable countries on a World Bank governance index measuring the quality of each country’s 
institutions. See id. 
 212.  See, e.g., CWP CVD I&D Memo, supra note 182, at 6-7; LWS CVD I&D Memo, supra 
note 182, at 82-83; OTR Tires CVD I&D Memo, supra note 182, at 7-9.  
 213.  CWP CVD I&D Memo, supra note 182, at 11.  
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substantial portion of the market for a good or service, prices for such goods and 
services in the country will be considered significantly distorted and will not be 
an appropriate basis of comparison for determining whether there is a 
benefit.”214 The USDOC then used the import prices the Chinese respondents 
paid to suppliers from outside of China or, when such import prices were not 
applicable, world market export prices, to determine if the Chinese SOEs 
provided a benefit to the downstream producers of the subject merchandise.215 
The USDOC also applied the same out-of-country benchmark analysis to 
Chinese land use subsidies. In Laminated Woven Sacks from the People’s 
Republic of China, the USDOC probed whether the Chinese government granted 
land-use rights to Chinese producers of the subject merchandise at below-market 
prices.216 The USDOC rejected Chinese land prices as the market price 
benchmark because “Chinese land prices are distorted by the significant 
government role in the market.”217 The USDOC then compared the prices for 
land use rights in China with certain land prices in Thailand, prices that the 
USDOC argued were “comparable market prices for land purchases in a country 
at a comparable level of economic development that is reasonably proximate to, 
but outside of, China.”218 
China challenged the USDOC’s use of out-of-country benchmarks for 
alleged Chinese input, loan, and land use subsidies before the WTO in two 
dispute settlement proceedings, DS379 and DS437. In DS379, China failed to 
persuade the panel and the Appellate Body that the USDOC acted inconsistently 
with WTO law in using such out-of-country benchmarks. As for input subsidies, 
the Appellate Body in DS379 interpreted its report in Softwood Lumber as 
“exclud[ing] the application of a per se rule, according to which an investigating 
authority could properly conclude in every case, and regardless of any other 
evidence, that the fact that the government is the predominant supplier means 
that private prices are distorted for the use of out-of-country benchmarks.”219 
The Appellate Body acknowledged that the USDOC’s consideration of factors 
other than government market share in the underlying proceedings “appears to 
have been somewhat cursory.”220 But since the Chinese government had a 
predominant 96.1% market share in the market in question, the Appellate Body 
considered the USDOC’s rejection of in-country benchmarks to be justified 
because “evidence of factors other than government market share will have less 
weight in the determination of price distortion than in a situation where the 
government has only a ‘significant’ presence in the market.”221 As for loan 
 
 214.  Id. at 64. 
 215.  Id. at 66. 
 216.  See LWS CVD I&D Memo, supra note 182, at 14. 
 217.  Id. at 15. 
 218.  Id. at 17. 
 219.  DS379 AB Report, supra note 164, ¶ 443. 
 220.  Id. ¶ 454. 
 221.  Id. ¶ 455. 
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subsidies, the Appellate Body held that its reasoning in Softwood Lumber 
concerning the use of out-of-country benchmarks was “equally applicable” in 
measuring the benefits of loan subsidies.222 On this basis, the Appellate Body 
concluded that the USDOC’s decision not to rely on interest rates in China for 
Chinese loans was “reasoned and adequate.”223 The Appellate Body found, 
however, that the panel below failed to make an objective assessment of whether 
the out-of-country benchmark constructed by the USDOC for Chinese loans was 
consistent with the requirement of Article 14(b) of the SCM Agreement.224 As 
for land use subsidies, an issue not appealed by China to the Appellate Body, the 
panel in DS379 determined that the USDOC underwent sufficient analysis in 
rejecting Chinese land-use prices as the subsidy benchmark.225 The panel further 
upheld the out-of-country benchmarks the USDOC constructed from Thailand 
prices, noting that although those out-of-country benchmarks were not a perfect 
representation of what land use prices would be in China in the absence of 
government distortions, it was not clear that adjusting the benchmarks in ways 
suggested by China “would ensure a closer approximation of the counterfactual 
situation.”226 
In DS437, China pressed again on the use of out-of-country benchmarks for 
Chinese input subsidies, this time with success. The Appellate Body in DS437 
found that the panel below “failed to conduct a case-by-case analysis of whether 
the USDOC had properly examined whether the relevant in-country prices were 
market determined or were distorted by governmental intervention.”227 Instead, 
the panel “simply assumed that because the Appellate Body had faced a similar 
situation in [DS379], China had failed to establish that the USDOC acted 
inconsistently with the obligations of the United States under Article 14(d).”228 
After reversing the panel, the Appellate Body went on to complete the legal 
analysis and concluded that the USDOC acted inconsistently with Article 14(d) 
of the SCM Agreement by rejecting in-country prices in China as the subsidy 
benchmark.229 According to the Appellate Body, the USDOC based its rejection 
of in-country prices in China on the fact that government-related entities were 
the predominant suppliers of the relevant goods.230 The USDOC did not explain 
whether and how the government-related suppliers “possessed and exerted 
 
 222.  Id. ¶ 489.  
 223.  Id. ¶ 509. 
 224.  Id. ¶ 527. But because of the lack of factual records before it, the Appellate Body was 
unable to make a judgment of its own on whether the USDOC’s out-of-country loan benchmark was 
sufficient. See id. ¶¶ 528-37. 
 225.   DS379 Panel Report, supra note 160, ¶ 10.81. 
 226.  Id. ¶ 10.189. 
 227.  Report of the Appellate Body, United States—Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain 
Products from China, ¶ 4.79, WT/DS437/AB/R (Dec. 18, 2014) [hereinafter DS437 AB Report]. 
 228.  Id. 
 229.  Id. ¶¶ 4.95-.96. 
 230.  Id. ¶ 4.95. 
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market power such that other in-country prices were distorted.”231 “Nor did the 
USDOC explain whether the prices of the [government-related suppliers] 
themselves were market determined.”232 
In sum, in a pattern that has become all too familiar, trade law has worked 
its way into a delicate balance regarding the use of out-of-country benchmarks 
for Chinese subsidies: It accepted such benchmarks when there was evidence of 
extensive market distortion by the Chinese government, but refused to infer 
market distortion simply from the Chinese government’s predominant presence 
in the market through SOEs. Investigating authorities would still be able to 
discard prices charged by Chinese SOEs as being distorted, but that would 
require a more rigorous market distortion analysis than simply pointing to the 
government ownership and control of those SOEs. This will pose a hurdle to 
efforts to use countervailing duty law as a protectionist tool against Chinese 
products. 
C.  Safeguards 
Aside from antidumping and countervailing duties, trade law also 
authorizes the imposition of so-called safeguard measures—measures that 
temporarily suspend a WTO member country’s tariff concessions or other WTO 
obligations in order to remedy serious injury to domestic industries caused by 
surges of imports from other WTO member countries.233 However, this type of 
safeguard, referred to as the general safeguard below, was considered inadequate 
to deal with surges of imports from China. Upon China’s entry into the WTO, 
WTO member countries negotiated with China a special, temporary type of 
safeguard that allows them to specifically target imports from China under 
lowered evidentiary standards.234 As will be discussed below, this “China 
safeguard” deviates from the WTO’s fundamental non-discrimination principle 
and is designed to channel protectionist pressures resulting from China’s WTO 
entry. 
Unlike antidumping and countervailing duties, which do not facially single 
out China, the China safeguard is by design a trade remedy instrument with 
explicit, lopsided biases against Chinese products. First, the China safeguard 
allows WTO member countries to suspend their WTO obligations only towards 
China, in sharp contrast to the non-discrimination requirement under the general 
safeguard.235 Second, the China safeguard can be invoked under a lower injury 
 
 231.  Id. ¶ 4.96. 
 232.  Id. 
 233.  See GATT 1994, supra note 30, art. XIX:1(a); WTO Agreement on Safeguards, June 1, 
1995, 1869 U.N.T.S. 154, art. 2.1 [hereinafter WTO Agreement on Safeguards].  
 234.  China Accession Protocol, supra note 86, ¶ 16.  
 235.  Article 2.2 of the WTO Agreement on Safeguards requires that a general safeguard be 
applied to imports regardless of source. See Agreement on Safeguards, arts. 2(2), in Final Act 
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 
I.L.M. 1125 (1994). 
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standard than the general safeguard. Under the China Accession Protocol, WTO 
member countries can resort to the China safeguard when Chinese products are 
imported “in such increased quantities or under such conditions as to cause or 
threaten to cause market disruption to the domestic producers of like or directly 
competitive products.”236 The term “market disruption” is further defined to 
refer to the situation where imports “are increasing rapidly, either absolutely or 
relatively, so as to be a significant cause of material injury, or threat of material 
injury to the domestic industry.”237 This injury standard is generally understood 
to be easier to meet than the “serious injury” standard under the general 
safeguard.238 Third, it is harder for China to seek trade compensations from 
countries that impose the China safeguard than for other countries to seek trade 
compensations from countries that impose the general safeguard. Under the 
general safeguard, a country whose products are subject to the safeguard is 
allowed to suspend substantially equivalent concessions to the trade of the 
country that imposes the safeguard,239 subject to a three-year delay if the 
safeguard is based on an absolute increase in imports.240 By contrast, under the 
China safeguard, China is entitled to no trade compensations for the first two 
years of a China safeguard even if the safeguard is based on a relative increase 
in imports.241 Finally, the general safeguard may not be applied for more than 
 
 236.  China Accession Protocol, supra note 86, ¶ 16.1. 
 237.  Id. art. 16.4. 
 238.  The “serious injury” standard under the general safeguard is defined in the WTO 
Agreement on Safeguards as “a significant overall impairment in the position of a domestic 
industry.” WTO Agreement on Safeguards, supra note 233, art. 4.1(a). The WTO Appellate Body 
has found that this standard is “exacting” and “very high” compared to the “material injury” standard 
contained in the WTO Antidumping Agreement, the SCM Agreement, and Article VI of the GATT. 
Report of the Appellate Body, United States—Safeguard Measures on Imports of Fresh, Chilled or 
Frozen Lamb Meat from New Zealand and Australia, ¶ 124, WT/DS177/AB/R, WT/DS178/AB/R 
(May 1, 2001). By contrast, the “market disruption” standard under the China safeguard is 
understood to be a lower standard. A White House summary of the U.S.-China Bilateral WTO 
Agreement, the blueprint for the China Accession Protocol, stated that under the China safeguard, 
the United States would be able to apply restraints unilaterally based on standards that are lower than 
those in the WTO Safeguards Agreement.” Summary of the U.S.-China Bilateral WTO Agreement, 
Prepared by the White House National Economic Council, November 15, 1999, 16 Int’l Trade Rep. 
(BNA) 1888, 1890 (1999). In a congressional testimony, then U.S. Trade Representative Charlene 
Barshefsky stated that the China safeguard “permits us to act based on lower showing of injury.” 
Accession of China to the WTO; Hearing Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th 
Cong. 49 (2000) (Statement of Hon. Charlene Barshefsky, United States Trade Representative). For 
more discussions of the injury standard under the general safeguard and the China safeguard, see 
Jeanne J. Grimmett, Chinese Tire Imports: Section 421 Safeguards and the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), CONG. RES. SERV. (Jul. 12, 2011), at 7-9; Jing Ma, Product-Specific Safeguard 
in China’s WTO Accession Agreement: An Analysis of Its Terms and Its Initial Application in 
Section 421 Investigations, 22 BU INT’L L.J. 189, 195-197 (2004).  
 239.  See WTO Agreement on Safeguards, supra note 233, art. 8.2.  
 240.  Id. art. 8.3. 
 241.  China Accession Protocol, supra note 86, ¶ 16.6 (“If a measure is taken as a result of a 
relative increase in the level of imports, China has the right to suspend the application of 
substantially equivalent concessions or obligations under the GATT 1994 to the trade of the WTO 
Member applying the measure, if such measure remains in effect more than two years.”). 
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four years initially and eight years in total.242 By contrast, the only requirement 
for the duration of the China safeguard is that the China safeguard is to be 
imposed “only for such period of time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy 
the market disruption.”243 
With these institutional biases against China on the China safeguard, the 
WTO Appellate Body has restrained itself from disturbing the outcome of 
China’s WTO entry negotiations. In one WTO dispute settlement proceeding, 
DS399, China challenged a safeguard measure applied by the United States to 
imports of certain passenger vehicle and light truck tires from China.244 The 
Appellate Body in DS399 took a very flexible approach to the interpretation of 
the phrase “increasing rapidly” in Paragraph 16.4 of the China Accession 
Protocol, granting investigating authorities sufficient leeway in determining 
whether the requisite “market disruption” exists for the invocation of the China 
safeguard.245 The Appellate Body then evaluated to what extent the injury to the 
importing country’s domestic industry must be caused by rapidly increasing 
imports from China before the China safeguard could be triggered.246 
Paragraph 16.4 of the China Accession Protocol provides that for there to 
be market disruption, imports from China must be increasing rapidly so as to be 
“a significant cause” of material injury, or threat of material injury, to the 
importing country’s domestic industry.247 The Appellate Body interpreted that 
language to mean that rapidly increasing imports from China “may be one of 
several causes that contribute to producing or bringing about material injury to 
the domestic industry.”248 The Appellate Body added that while “the 
contribution made by rapidly increasing imports to the material injury of the 
 
 242.  WTO Agreement on Safeguards, supra note 233, art. 7.1, 7.3. 
 243.  China Accession Protocol, supra note 86, ¶ 16.6. Note, however, that China is entitled to 
suspend substantially equivalent concessions to the trade of the country imposing the China 
safeguard if the safeguard is still in effect after two years where the safeguard was based on a 
relative increase in imports, or after three years where the safeguard was based on an absolute 
increase in imports. See id. 
 244.  See Request for Consultation by China, United States—Measures Affecting Imports of 
Certain Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Tyres from China, WT/DS399/1 (Sept. 16, 2009), at 1. 
 245.  See Report of the Appellate Body, United States—Measures Affecting Imports of Certain 
Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Tyres from China, ¶¶ 126-170, WT/DS399/AB/R (Sept. 5, 2011) 
[hereinafter DS399 AB Report]. Specifically, the Appellate Body held that the “increasing rapidly” 
phrase did not require an investigating authority to “focus on the movements in imports during the 
most recent past, or during the period immediately preceding the authority’s decision.” Id. ¶ 149. 
The Appellate Body also found that the ordinary meaning of the term “rapidly” did not suggest “an 
exclusive focus on the rates of increase in subject imports.” Id. ¶ 158. Particularly, the Appellate 
Body held that a decline in the yearly rate of increase did not necessarily preclude a finding that 
imports are increasing rapidly. Id. ¶ 162. Finally, the Appellate Body held that the phrase 
“increasingly rapidly” did not require an investigating authority to assess the most recent rate of 
increase in subject imports relative to the rates of increase in earlier periods. Id. ¶ 167. 
 246.  Id. ¶¶ 171-338. 
 247.  China Accession Protocol, supra note 86, ¶ 16.4.  
 248.  DS399 AB Report, supra note 245, ¶ 177. 
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domestic industry must be important or notable,”249 the inclusion of the term 
“significant” to qualify “a cause” does not impose “a more rigorous causation 
standard than other WTO agreements, which require that imports ‘cause’ 
injury.”250 In so holding, the Appellate Body essentially read the word 
“significant” out of the injury standard for the China safeguard. Furthermore, in 
what appeared to be an insinuation that China itself negotiated a lower injury 
standard for the China safeguard as part of its WTO entry deal, the Appellate 
Body stated that the object and purpose of the China Accession Protocol “seems 
to weigh in favour of an interpretation pursuant to which temporary relief is 
available whenever rapidly increasing imports are making an ‘important’, rather 
than a ‘particularly strong [and] substantial’, contribution to the material injury 
of the domestic industry.”251 Based on this low injury standard, the Appellate 
Body finally held that the United States International Trade Commission did not 
err in concluding that rapidly increasing imports from China were a significant 
cause of material injury to the domestic industry within the meaning of 
Paragraph 16.4 of the China Accession Protocol.252 
The China safeguard epitomizes the perpetual dilemma facing trade law: 
On one hand, trade law needs to adhere to principles to maintain a rule-based 
trade system, but on the other hand, trade law needs sufficient flexibility to 
accommodate and contain disruptive forces like China. The China safeguard 
solves this dilemma by compromising on principles, but only for a limited 
period of time. Pursuant to Paragraph 16.9 of the China Accession Protocol, the 
duration of the China safeguard is limited to twelve years from China’s WTO 
entry.253 The China safeguard, therefore, expired on December 11, 2013. With 
this temporary deviation from principles, trade law afforded the world trade 
community greater abilities to withstand the impact from liberalizing trade with 
China. 
D. Managed Trade 
One important feature of trade law’s responses to China’s rise in world 
trade is its tolerance of the frequent uses of managed trade measures – namely, 
restrictive trade measures imposed through voluntary agreements, for Chinese 
products. As will be discussed below, one guiding principle of trade law is to 
discourage the use of managed trade measures, but when it comes to China, 
managed trade has played an important role in easing the tensions stemming 
from China’s participation in the world trade order. 
Managed trade was once a mainstay in world trade. Between 1974 and 
2005, world trade in textiles and apparel products was governed by an exquisite 
 
 249.  Id. 
 250.  Id. ¶ 181. The Appellate Body believed that the term “cause” in other WTO agreements 
also required a “genuine and substantial relationship of cause and effect.” Id. 
 251.  Id. ¶ 184. 
 252.  Id. ¶ 338.  
 253.  China Accession Protocol, supra note 86, ¶ 16.9. 
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managed-trade system established under the Multi-Fiber Arrangement 
(MFA),254 which allowed “a complex system of unilateral and bilateral quotas, 
on a product-by-product and country-by-country basis.”255 In the 1970s and 
1980s, GATT member countries frequently resorted to the so-called voluntary 
export restraints (VERs), that is, negotiated export arrangements outside the 
rubric of GATT rights and obligations, as a way of resolving trade disputes.256 
VERs gained increasing popularity with countries seeking to protect their 
domestic industries257 and became “arguably the most pernicious form of 
protection in the 1970s and 1980s.” 258 
Managed-trade measures like VERs have been widely criticized as 
operating in a gray area outside of the GATT framework and undermining the 
integrity of the multilateral trade system.259 The adverse economic impact of 
managed trade has also been well-documented.260 But nonetheless, managed 
trade became a popular trade policy tool because it was a politically attractive 
form of protection.261 In particular, all of the parties involved in a managed-
trade regime, including the importing country, the exporting country, and third 
countries, lack sufficient incentives to object to its use.262 
 
 254.  See Multi-Fiber Arrangement, Formerly the Arrangement Regarding International Trade 
in Textiles, 25 UST 1001, TIAS No 7840 (Dec 20, 1973). 
 255.  Alice J.-H. Wohn, Towards GATT Integration: Circumventing Quantitative Restrictions 
on Textiles and Apparel Trade under the Multi Fiber Arrangement, 22 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 375, 
395 (2001).  
 256.  Many of such VERs were targeted at Japan, whose surging exports at the time were 
flooding the world market. In the 1970s and the 1980s, a number of Japanese products, including 
color television sets, motor vehicles, video tape recorders, motor cycles, machine tools, quartz 
watches, and fork-lift trucks were made subject to voluntary export arrangements negotiated 
between the United States, Europe, and Canada on one hand and Japan on the other hand. See Philip 
Turner & Jean-Pierre Tuveri, Some Effects of Export Restraints on Japanese Trading Behavior, 
OECD ECON. STUD., Spring 1984, 93, 94-95.  
 257.  As of 1991, only twenty four safeguard measures taken pursuant to Article XIX of the 
GATT were in force, while two hundred and eighty four gray-area measures such as VERs were 
known to exist. Terence P. Stewart et al., Opportunities in the WTO for Increased Liberalization of 
Goods: Making Sure the Rules Work for All and That Special Needs Are Addressed, 24 FORDHAM 
INT’L L.J. 652, 657 (2000).  
 258.  Jeffrey J. Schott, Safeguards, in THE NEW WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: READINGS 113, 114 
(Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development ed., 1994). 
 259.  See, e.g., JAGDISH BHAGWATI, PROTECTIONISM 47 (1988); ALAN O. SYKES, THE WTO 
AGREEMENT ON SAFEGUARDS: A COMMENTARY 24-25 (2006). 
 260.  See, e.g., Jaime de Melo & L. Alan Winters, Do Exporters Gain from VERs?, 37 EUR. 
ECON. REV. 1331 (1993) (arguing that VERs cause efficiency losses to importing countries by 
inducing inputs to shift from their most efficient industries to protected industries); Phedon 
Nicolaides, Safeguards and the Problem of VERs, INTERECONOMICS, January/February 1990, 18, 
21-22 (arguing that VERs encourage collusion among producers in the exporting country). 
 261.  Nicolaides, supra note 260, at 20.  
 262.  Id. The affected exporting country tolerates managed trade because it would enable the 
exporting country to charge higher prices. The importing country prefers managed trade because 
unlike tariffs, quantitative restrictions under managed trade prevent foreign producers from 
increasing their market share as their efficiency improves. Third countries rarely object to managed 
trade because it handicaps their most efficient competitors. Id.  
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In the Uruguay Round negotiations, the GATT sought a collective solution 
to the managed trade problem and undertook an ambitious task of reining in the 
use of managed-trade measures like the VERs. As a result of the Uruguay 
Round, the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) was signed as one of the 
basic legal texts of the newly established WTO.263 The ATC terminated the 
managed trade system for the textiles and clothing sector with a ten-year phase-
out period.264 During the phase-out period, quotas for textiles and clothing 
products were progressively reduced until they were completely eliminated on 
January 1, 2005.265 As for VERs, the WTO Agreement on Safeguards provides 
that WTO member countries “shall not seek, take or maintain any voluntary 
export restraints, orderly marketing agreements or other similar measures on the 
export or the import side.”266 The prohibited actions include “actions taken by a 
single Member as well as actions under agreements, arrangements and 
understandings entered into by two or more Members.”267 
China’s WTO entry in 2001, however, posed a problem for the WTO’s 
efforts to scale back managed trade. The sheer size of China’s economy 
demanded flexibility in dealing with China’s potential impact on world trade, 
and, aside from creative applications of antidumping and countervailing duty 
laws, trade law resorted to managed trade as a way of providing that flexibility. 
Trade law’s turn to managed trade can be seen in the way it accommodated 
China in the textiles and clothing sector. China joined the WTO in 2001, three 
years before the quota system established under the MFA was scheduled to be 
dismantled.268 To protect importing countries from the short-term shock that 
China would be causing to the textiles and clothing markets in a quota-less 
world,269 the WTO created a special safeguard mechanism just for textiles and 
clothing products from China for the first three years after the expiration of the 
ATC. Paragraph 242 of the Working Party Report on China’s Accession allows 
 
 263.  Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods—Results of 
the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 28, http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal_e/16-tex.pdf. 
 264.  Id. art. 9 (“This Agreement and all restrictions thereunder shall stand terminated on the 
first day of the 121st month that the WTO Agreement is in effect, on which date the textiles and 
clothing sector shall be fully integrated into GATT 1994. There shall be no extension of this 
Agreement.”). 
 265.  Id. art. 2.6-2.7.  
 266.  WTO Agreement on Safeguards, supra note 233, art. 11.1(b). In a footnote, Article 
11.1(b) of the WTO Agreement on Safeguards provides that “examples of similar measures include 
export moderation, export-price or import-price monitoring systems, export or import surveillance, 
compulsory import cartels and discretionary export or import licensing schemes, any of which afford 
protection.” Id. art. 11.1(b) n.4. 
 267.  Id. art. 11.1(b). 
 268.  As noted above, the ATC was scheduled to terminate on January 1, 2005. See supra note 
264 and accompanying text. 
 269.  Between 2001 and 2004, China’s exports of textiles and clothing products to the United 
States more than doubled, increasing from about $7 billion to about $15 billion. UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, U.S.-CHINA TRADE: TEXTILE SAFEGUARD PROCEDURES 
SHOULD BE IMPROVED (April 2005), at 1.  
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WTO member countries to place limits on imports of textiles and clothing 
products from China through the end of 2008 if such imports “were, due to 
market disruption, threatening to impede the orderly development of trade in 
these products.”270 
Both the European Union and the United States took advantage of the 
special China textiles safeguard. In April 2005, the European Commission 
launched safeguard investigations into the sharp surge in imports of Chinese 
textiles and clothing products to the European Union.271 On June 10, 2005, the 
European Union and China reached an agreement to terminate the pending 
safeguard investigations and to manage the growth of Chinese imports to the 
EU.272 In a quintessential managed-trade deal, the EU and China agreed to limit 
growth in ten categories of Chinese imports to between 8 percent and 12.5 
percent per year for 2005, 2006, and 2007.273 In the United States, twice in 2003 
and again in 2004, U.S. producers petitioned the U.S. government for safeguard 
quotas on imports of textiles and clothing products from China.274 The U.S. 
government granted all three petitions and imposed quotas on ten categories of 
textiles and clothing products imported from China.275 On November 6, 2005, 
the United States and China signed a memorandum of understanding that 
replaced those quotas and additional pending safeguard investigations with a 
managed-trade system covering most categories of textiles and clothing products 
for 2006, 2007, and 2008.276 The U.S.-China MOU capped the rate of increase 
of imports of textiles products from China to the U.S. to 12.5 percent in 2006 
and 2007, and 15 percent in 2008.277 For imports of clothing products from 
China to the U.S., the maximum rate of increase was 10 percent in 2006, 12.5 
percent in 2007, and 15 percent in 2008.278 
Aside from authorizing managed trade for Chinese textiles and clothing 
products, trade law has also tolerated the use of managed trade for Chinese 
products for which it has not been explicitly authorized. In July 2013, the 
European Commission reached a price undertaking agreement with Chinese 
solar panel exporters to settle pending antidumping investigations into Chinese 
 
 270.  Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China, WT/MIN01(3) (Nov. 10, 2001), 
¶ 242. 
 271.  Press Release, European Commission launches investigations into sharp surge in Chinese 
textiles imports, IP/05/473 (Apr. 24, 2005), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-05-473_en.htm. 
 272.  See Press Release, EU-China textiles agreement 10 June 2005, MEMO/05/201 (Jun. 12, 
2005), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-05-201_en.htm?locale=en.  
 273.  Id.  
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Since the End of Quotas, CRS Report for Congress (Jul. 10, 2007), at 23. 
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 276.  See Memorandum of Understanding Between the Governments of the United States of 
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solar panel products sold in the European Union.279 The price undertaking 
agreement replaced provisional antidumping duties imposed on imports of 
Chinese solar panel products to the EU with a minimum price commitment that 
capped the price of the Chinese imports at fifty-six euro cents per watt.280 The 
agreement did not exempt Chinese solar panel imports from antidumping duties 
when such imports exceeded seven gigawatts, roughly half of the EU’s demand 
for solar panels.281 The price undertaking agreement, therefore, functioned as a 
tacit permission for Chinese producers to supply half of the EU’s solar panel 
market. Although this attempt at managing solar panel trade between the EU and 
China does not technically violate WTO rules,282 it goes against the spirit of the 
WTO’s prohibition of VERs in every practical sense.283 
In sum, despite trade law’s earlier efforts to limit the use of managed trade, 
it had to turn to the device as a way of mitigating the impact of China on the 
world trade order. Again, between principles and protectionism, trade law had to 
favor the latter, albeit temporarily and tacitly, to accommodate the disruptive 
forces that China would have otherwise unleashed onto the world trade system. 
III. 
TRADE LAW’S REBALANCING: SUCCESS OR FAILURE? 
The foregoing discussions tell a story of how China disrputed trade law’s 
balance. As trade law deviates from its previous principles-versus-protectionism 
equilibrium, a crucial question to ask is whether trade law will be able to 
stabilize in a new equilibrium where China’s role in world trade is taken into 
account. 
Unfortunately, this question cannot be fully answered before China’s role 
itself is stabilized. Will China continue on the path of expansion it has been on 
 
 279.  European Commission Press Release, Commissioner De Gucht: “We found an amicable 
solution in the EU-China solar panels case that will lead to a new market equilibrium at sustainable 
prices” (Jul. 27, 2013),  http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-729_en.htm.  
 280.  Robin Emmott & Ben Blanchard, EU, China resolve solar dispute - their biggest trade 
row by far, REUTERS (Jul. 27, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/27/us-eu-china-solar-
idUSBRE96Q03Z20130727.  
 281.  Id. 
 282.  The WTO Antidumping Agreement allows WTO member countries to suspend or 
terminate antidumping proceedings “upon receipt of satisfactory voluntary undertakings from any 
exporter to revise its prices or to cease exports to the area in question at dumped prices so that the 
authorities are satisfied that the injurious effect of the dumping is eliminated.” WTO Antidumping 
Agreement, supra note 33, art. 8.1. 
 283.  Michael Moore demonstrates that in a perfectly-competitive small-country model, a 
maximum level of imports under a VER and a minimum import price undertaking can result in 
identically higher prices, lower imports, increased domestic profits, and higher domestic production 
compared to free trade. See Michael O. Moore, VERs and Price Undertakings under the WTO, 13 
REV. INT’L ECON. 298, 298 (2005). Moore further demonstrates that in the context of a domestic 
monopoly facing foreign competition, a minimum price undertaking can result in even lower 
consumer welfare than under a quantity-based VER. Id. at 298-99. 
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in the last three decades?284 Or will China plateau and be integrated into a steady 
world trade system?285 Or will China’s export growth collapse and force the 
legal structures that trade law put in place in response to China’s rise to 
unravel?286 Without knowing which development trajectory China will follow, it 
is premature to predict whether or when trade law’s rebalancing act on China 
will be complete. 
That said, a preliminary assessment of trade law’s responses to China’s rise 
so far could yield valuable policy implications. This assessment has to be done 
in light of the ultimate goals trade law is supposed to serve. Given the two 
competing considerations of trade law—free trade principles and 
protectionism—an objective evaluation of whether trade law has by far 
successfully handled challenges posed by China requires the assessor to 
approach the task from a holistic point of view, taking into account both 
considerations. Under this holistic approach, the criterion for judging the success 
or failure of trade law’s rebalancing in response to China has to be whether trade 
law was able to offer protection from China’s impact without deviating too 
much from its core principles. 
Based on the analyses in the previous section, this Article’s answer to the 
question of whether trade law has by far succeeded in accommodating China is a 
cautious “yes.” On one hand, trade law’s record on China is not perfect: on 
many occasions it has shifted, blatantly or subtly, to a less principle-oriented 
approach in contravention of the fundamental principles cherished by trade law 
elsewhere. Trade law sanctioned the use of surrogate values in antidumping 
proceedings in a manner that gives importing countries wide discretion to inflate 
antidumping margins for Chinese products. Trade law considered China’s 
economy to be market-based enough to apply countervailing duty law, but not 
market-based enough to warrant market-economy treatment in antidumping 
proceedings. Trade law also fashioned a discriminatory China-specific safeguard 
and tolerated the use of managed trade that it had vowed to eliminate in other 
settings for Chinese products.287 All of these represent a shift towards 
protectionism at the expense of sound, consistent principles. 
But on the other hand, trade law has corrected itself on some of the most 
egregious protectionist policies on China. Trade law rejected the presumption of 
 
 284.  Proponents of this scenario predict that China’s economy will soon surpass that of the 
United States to become the world’s largest. See Chinese and American GDP Forecasts: Catching 
the Eagle, ECONOMIST (Aug. 22, 2014), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2014/08/chinese-and-american-gdp-forecasts.  
 285.  Official economic data coming out of China suggests that China’s GDP growth has 
slowed in recent years but is not showing further signs of deceleration. In the first two quarters of 
2015, China maintained an enviable growth rate of seven percent. See Mark Magnier, China 
Surprises With 7% Growth in Second Quarter, WALL ST. J. (Jul. 21, 2015), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-surprises-with-7-growth-in-second-quarter-1436927081.  
 286.  This scenario is likely if China’s economic growth stalls. For a pessimistic view of the 
prospect of China’s economy, see Paul Krugman, Hitting China’s Wall, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 18, 2013), 
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 287.  See supra Part II. 
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country-wide antidumping duty rates for Chinese products, forced investigating 
authorities to not double-count certain types of Chinese subsidies when applying 
countervailing duty law in conjunction with antidumping law, declined to 
automatically treat Chinese SOEs as public bodies capable of conferring 
subsidies, and refused to infer price distortion merely from government 
dominance in the market. These decisions demonstrate trade law’s commitments 
to principles even in the face of high protectionist pressures. 
Trade law’s responses to China have been rather successful especially 
compared to its responses to the previous disruptor of the world trade system––
Japan.  Between the 1950s and the 1980s, when Japan was upending the existing 
world trade order, the world trade community responded primarily with bilateral 
negotiations, retaliations, and threats of retaliations.288  In particular, in one of 
the most infamous trade wars in world trade history, the United States reached a 
managed-trade agreement with Japan on trade in semiconductor products and, 
after Japan allegedly violated the agreement, imposed retaliatory tariffs on 
imports from Japan.289 By contrast, the world trade community managed to 
avoid such disruptive spikes in tariffs against Chinese products, despite its many 
maneuvers not entirely consistent with trade law principles. More importantly, 
the world trade community managed to incorporate China into the world trade 
system without major political, economic, and social upheavals. As an 
indication of that incorporation, China has become one of the countries that 
most frequently make use of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism.290 
The interactive dynamics between free trade principles and protectionism 
identified in this Article have important policy implications.  First of all, they 
hold predicative values for the future trajectory of trade law as applied to China.  
One important insight from this Article is that trade law is never an outcome of 
principles alone, or protectionism alone. Interpretations of trade law—and 
predictions of what those interpretations will be—have to be made in light of 
both.  The ongoing debates on China’s market-economy status after December 
2016 provides a perfect example.  As discussed above, Paragraph 15(a)(ii) of the 
China Accession Protocol, which provides for the use of surrogate values in 
antidumping proceedings involving Chinese products, expires in December 
2016.291 Views diverge, however, as to whether China should be granted 
market-economy status automatically upon the expiration of Article 15(a)(ii), or 
whether WTO member countries should be allowed to continute to treat China 
as a non-market economy if China does not meet their standards for being 
considered a market economy. In February 2016, the European Union launched 
 
 288.  See John O. Haley, Luck, Law, Culture and Trade: The Intractability of United States-
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 289.  See JOHN M. ROTHGEB, JR., U.S. TRADE POLICY: BALANCING ECONOMIC DREAMS AND 
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public consultation on how to proceed on China’s market-economy status.292 
Options being considered by the EU included automatic market-economy status 
for China either with or without strengthened trade remedy rules in other 
respects.293 The United States, however, appears reluctant to consider the 
possibility of automatically granting China market-economy status.294 While a 
full examination of this issue is beyond the scope of this Article, the analysis set 
forth in this Article suggests that the eventual outcome of this issue will not 
depend on legal analysis alone.295 Instead, it will depend in large part on 
commercial circumstances.296 If the threat from Chinese exports is perceived to 
be waning, and if China is showing willingness to allay trading partners’ 
concerns in other aspects of trade policy such as currency manipulation, it will 
be much easier for China’s trading partners to come to the conclusion that the 
expiration of Article 15(a)(ii) mandates market-economy status for China.297 In 
other words, decisions on China’s market-economy status are inherently policy 
decisions, particularly so when the legal analysis does not provide unambiguous 
answers. 
Finally, the principles-versus-protectionism dynamics identified in this 
Article will also likely determine trade law’s responses to the next challenger to 
the world trade system. If the next challenger threatens the stability of the world 
trade system like China does, trade law will likely show flexibilities on 
principles to contain the challenger. The specific issues on which trade law will 
show flexibilities, however, may not be the same as those featured in trade law’s 
China responses. Particularly, if the next challenger is generally considered a 
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market-economy country, the next rounds of trade law debates may not revolve 
around issues that are peculiar to non-market economies, such as surrogate 
values and country-wide rates in antidumping. What is certain, however, is that 
trade law will tolerate deviations from principles on some issues and those 
deviations will allow trade law to adjust the level of trade protection 
commiserate with the level of threats posed by the challenger. 
CONCLUSION 
World trade has undergone a sea change since China began its ascent in the 
global economic order. So has trade law. In almost all major areas of trade law, 
there has been a shift towards protectionism at the expense of principles. But on 
some of the most important trade policy issues relating to China, trade law has 
overcome the urge to become a purely protectionist exercise. These nuanced 
responses to China reveal the protean nature of trade law and offer guidance as 
to how trade law will likely handle future disruptors of the world trade system. 
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